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#### The central question of this debate is whose politics best creates a radical break with capitalism—the 1AC’s focus on particular identities reduces capitalism to just one of a set of antagonisms and causes endless subdivision of political demands which dangerously distracts from revolutionary politics proper—this round is a question of starting points—the perm can never be truly radical because the 1AC’s particular focus has always already ceded the universal

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If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics. The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of the class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems. They fight to reduce suffering, but the background of it cannot be addressed adequately within the political frame of identity politics. We can therefore place identity politics and multiculturalism in a broader, political context: So we are fighting our PC battles for the right of ethnic minor - ities, of gays and lesbians, of different lifestyles, and so forth, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for the unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, the very mention of capitalism as a world system tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on. The price of this depoliticization of the economy is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities and the tolerance of differences. (Žižek 1999: 218) The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing. ‘Class antagonism certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity.’ (Žižek 2000c: 320). Identity politics reduces the question concerning economy to one among several questions on an equal level. Two fatal consequences follow from this. Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits. Secondly, and related to the former point, the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism. When Laclau and others with him give the reader a choice between class struggle (Marxism) or postmodernity (iden - tity politics), then the problem is not only that they make the wrong choice (i.e. deny Marxism), but also, and more fundamentally, that they do not see that capital itself has become postmodern. And fur - ther, that there is a speculative connection between capitalism and postmodern identity politics. The latter serves postmodern capitalism as its perfect superstructure. The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics (in Laclau), or the passage from sexual essen - tialism to contingent gender-formation (in Butler), or – a fur - ther example – the passage from metaphysician to ironist in Richard Rorty, is not a simple epistemological progress but part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety. (Žižek 2000a: 106) The central question after this conclusion becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism for a way to think revolutionary change. We earlier defined the political as the process in which par - ticular demands are elevated from being an expression of particular interests to being demands of a universal restructuring of the societal order. Postmodern identity politics on this background appears to be fundamentally apolitical. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like. What these ‘policies’ basically do, and this is what makes them reactionary, is to reinforce already exist - ing social positions (Žižek 1999: 208). The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough. The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all, which in turn means that the new left, exemplified by Laclau, Butler, and Rorty, are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests (Žižek 2000a: 108). The right to narrate, which is the point of departure of identity politics, is blocking the universalisation of specific demands. We have already discussed that. But there are other problems as well. Identity politics is morally blind. Yes, all ‘progressives’ support the rights of gays and lesbians. But what about the right of bikers to their lifestyle – driving Harleys really fast, being tattooed and controlling drug sales. Should young guests in night clubs have a right to take drugs – this is a kind of lifestyle as well, isn’t it? Do parents have a right to circumcise their daughters if it is part of their tradition to do so? Or should the Nazis have a right to march through town, spread propaganda and recruit young supporters? Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate (Žižek 2002b: 177). Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected. Moral involvement is never at stake – one could rather speak of indifference. Another problem is that there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and thereby the division of groups that need special treat - ment: lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end? ‘Postmodernists’ do not seem to have an answer for that. Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised. The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not (Žižek 1999: 203– 204). What also seems to be forgotten is that anti-essentialism and relativism make for a position of strength, i.e. a position that can only be taken from a privileged, distanced position of supervision. It is the position from which all substantial positioning can be dismissed as essentialism, fundamentalism, primitivism, dogmatism or similar ‘isms’. The antiessentialist position is imagined to be an unprejudiced, neutral posi - tion. But this ‘neutrality’ is fake. It is a kind of ‘universalism’ which in reality supports only one given and particular societal order – cap - italism (Žižek 2001d: 103). The reference to objectively given eco - nomic limitations or ‘Development’ as it is called today seems to be the card that trumps everything. If it is played, there seems to be no way around adjusting and renouncing. Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game so that such trumps lose their significance.

#### The aff is wasted energy – fighting particular battles without changing the way the economy works means nothing really changes – the aff just obscures the logic of capitalism

**Zizek, ’99** (Slavoj, Senior Researcher and professor at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, The Ticklish Subject, page 352-355)

The big news of today’s post-political age of the ‘end of ideology’ is thus the radical depoliticization of the sphere of the economy: the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things. However, as long as this fundamental depoliticization of the economic sphere is accepted, all the talk about active citizenship, about public discussion leading to responsible collective decisions, and so on, will remain limited to the ‘cultural’ issues of religious, sexual, ethnic and other way-of-life differences, without actually encroaching upon the level at which long-term decisions that affect us all are made. In short, the only way effectively to bring about a society in which risky long-term decisions would ensue from public debate involving all concerned is some kind of radical limitation of Capital’s freedom, the subordinated of the process of production to social control – the radical repoliticization of the economy. That is to say: if the problem with today’s post-politics (‘administration of social affairs’) is that it increasingly undermines the possibility of a proper political act, this undermining is directly due to the depoliticization of economics, to the common acceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/ procedures to be exploited. We can now see why today’s post-politics cannot attain the properly political dimension of universality; because it silently precludes the sphere of economy from politicization. The domain of global capitalist market relations in the Other Scene of the so-called repoliticization of civil society advocated by the partisans of ‘identity politics’ and other postmodern forms of politicization: all the talk about new forms of politics bursting out all over, focused on particular issues (gay rights, ecology, ethnic minorities…), all this incessant activity of fluid, shifting identities, of building multiple ad hoc coalitions, and so on, has something inauthentic about it, and ultimately resembles the obsessional neurotic who talks all the time and is otherwise frantically active precisely in order to ensure that something – what really matters – will *not* be disturbed, that it will remain immobilized. 35 So, instead of celebrating the new freedoms and responsibilities brought about by the ‘second modernity’, it is much more crucial to focus on what remains the same in this global fluidity and reflexivity, on what serves as the very motor of this fluidity: the inexorable logic of Capital. The spectral presence of Capital is the figure of the big Other which not only remains operative when all the traditional embodiments of the symbolic big Other disintegrate, but even directly causes this disintegration: far from being confronted with the abyss of their freedom – that is, laden with the burden of responsibility that cannot be alleviated by the helping hand of Tradition or Nature – today’s subject is perhaps more than ever caught in an inexorable compulsion that effectively runs his life.

#### Narrativization of suffering in the debate space is an empty act of tolerance that ensures that nothing really changes

Zizek 8—Institute for Social Sciences, Ljubljana (Slavoj, The Prospects of Radical Politics Today, Int’l Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 5;1)

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Let us take two predominant topics of to day's American radical academia: postcolonial and queer (gay) studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, "postcolonial studies" tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities' "right to narrate" their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress "otherness," so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other, and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves. The politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas ... The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included – up to a point), but conceptual: notions of "European" critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of Cultural Studies chic.

My personal experience is that practically all of the "radical" academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model, with the secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play on the stock market). If there is a thing they are gen­uinely horrified of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life environ­ment of the "symbolic classes" in the developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when dealing with sexism, racism, Third World sweatshops, etc., is thus ultimately a defense against their own innermost identi­fication, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: "Let's talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change to make sure that nothing will really change!" Symptomatic here is the journal October: when you ask one of the editors to what the title refers, they will half-confidentially signal that it is, of course, that October – in this way, one can indulge in the jargonistic analyses of modern art, with the hidden assurance that one is somehow retaining the link with the radical revolutionary past ... With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture toward Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise: they at least play their game straight and are honest in their acceptance of global capitalist coordinates, in contrast to the pseudo-radical academic Leftists who adopt toward the Third Way the attitude of utter disdain, while their own radi­cality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obligates no one to any­thing determinate.

II. From Human to Animal Rights

We live in the "postmodern" era in which truth­ claims as such are dismissed as an expression of hidden power mechanisms – as the reborn pseudo-Nietzscheans like to emphasize, truth is a lie which is most efficient in asserting our will to power. The very question "Is it true?" apropos of some statement is supplanted by another question: "Under what power con­ditions can this statement be uttered?" What we get instead of the universal truth is a multitude of perspectives, or, as it is fashionable to put it today, of "narratives" – not only of literature, but also of politics, religion, science, they are all different narratives, stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, and the ultimate goal of ethics is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist, in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell his/her story. The two philosophers of today's global capitalism are the two great Left-liberal "progres­sives," Richard Rorty and Peter Singer – honest in their respective stances. Rorty defines the basic coordinates: the fundamental dimension of a human being is the ability to suffer, to experience pain and humiliation – consequently, since humans are symbolic animals, the fundamental right is the right to nar­rate one's experience of suffering and humiliation.2 Singer then provides the Darwinian background.3

#### The 1AC’s naïve liberal faith in the courts cedes resistance to capitalism

Meszaros ‘06 (Istvan, Chair of Philosophy, University of Sussex, "Structural Crisis of Politics," Monthly Review, September, Proquest)

In the meantime so many grave problems are crying out for genuine solutions which could be well within our reach. Some of them have been with us for several decades, imposing terrible suffering and sacrifices on millions of people. Colombia is an oustanding example. For forty years the forces of oppression—internal and external, U.S. dominated—tried to suffocate the struggle of the Colombian people, without success. Attempts to reach a negotiated settlement—“with the participation of all social groups, without exception, in order to reconcile the Colombian family,” in the words of Manuel Marulanda Vélez, the leader of FARC-EP—have been systematically frustrated.16 As Vélez wrote in an open letter addressed recently to a presidential candidate: “No government, liberal or conservative, produced an effective political solution to the social and armed conflict. The negotiations were used for the purpose of changing nothing, so that everything should remain the same. All of the political schemes of the governments were using the Constitution and the laws as a barrier, to make sure that everything continues the way as we had it before.”17 Thus, when the dominant social interests dictate it, “constitutionality” and the rules of “democratic consensus” are used in Colombia (and elsewhere) as cynical devices for evading and forever postponing the solution of even the most burning issues, no matter how immense might be the scale of suffering imposed, as a result, on the people. And by the same token, in a different social context but under the same kind of deeply embedded structural determinations, even the most blatant and openly admitted violations of established constitutionality are disregarded, despite the periodic ritual lip service paid to the necessity to respect the constitutional requirements. In this sense, when the Congressional committee investigating the “Irangate Contra Affairs” had concluded that the Reagan administration was responsible for “subverting the Law and undermining the Constitution,” absolutely nothing happened to condemn, let alone to remove, the guilty president. And in yet another type of case—as we have seen in the ruling LDP government’s determination to subvert the Japanese Constitution—when the original constitutional clauses appear to be obstacles to embarking on perilous new military adventures, the dominant social and political interests of the country impose a new legal framework whose principal function is to liquidate the once proclaimed democratic safeguards and turn what was formerly decreed unlawful into arbitrarily institutionalized “constitutional lawfulness.” Nor should we forget what has been happening in a most adverse, and in its trend dangerously authoritarian, sense to British and United States constitutionality during the last few years. As I indicated at the beginning, we cannot attribute the chronic problems of our social interchanges to more or less easily corrigible political contingencies. So much is at stake, and we have historically rather limited time at our disposal in order to redress, in a socially sustainable way, the all too obvious grievances of the structurally subordinated social classes. The question of why?—concerning substantive matters, and not simply the contingent personal failures, even when they happen to be serious, as the frequently highlighted instances of widespread political corruption are—cannot be avoided indefinitely. It is necessary to investigate the social causes and deep-seated structural determinations at the roots of the disturbing negative trends in politics and the law, in order to be able to explain their stubborn persistence and worsening at the present time. This question of why is what I wish to pursue now.

#### Vote neg on ethics - resisting this reliance on economic evaluation is the ultimate ethical responsibility

**Zizek and Daly** 20**04**

(Slavoj, professor of philosophy at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana, and Glyn, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, Conversations with Zizek, page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### This is not a meaningless question – the structures of capitalism are driving multiple large-scale processes that are increasingly out of the control of individuals living their lives. Global warming, multiple wars of accumulation, loss of land and income stratification: all of these are making life unlivable.

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, *THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*, pp. 145-147)

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is.

It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3

The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now.

We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.”5

The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.6 Adaptability, modifications, and displacement, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. Under capitalism, one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven.

For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure – myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage – outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength, stamina, and courage with the people around you. All the rest is false hope.

In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

#### Their historical analysis is faulty--Capitalism predetermined Japanese interment and oppression

API, 12 [Asian American Movement Ezine, A history of the camps: Japanese American imprisonment during World War II, <http://www.apimovement.com/japanese-americans/history-camps-japanese-american-imprisonment-during-world-war>, jj]

In order to understand how the camps ever could have happened in the first place, we must look back upon the history of Japanese people prior to World War II. The first point of entry was Hawaii, which had been colonized by U.S. capitalists. In 1868 a group of Japanese contract laborers arrived to work the sugar and pineapple plantations. After the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, the U.S. capitalists, looking for a new source of cheap labor, pressured the Japanese government to allow its workers to emigrate. The early immigrants came over mainly as contract laborers and worked as migrant farm workers in the fields, orchards and vineyards of the West Coast. Others worked on section gangs on the railroad lines of the Great Northern Pacific and Central Pacific or in the Alaskan canneries, and the copper and coal mines of Utah and Colorado. These workers were greatly exploited by the capitalists. For example, Japanese railroad workers on the Northern Pacific labored in the bitter cold for less than $1 a day. Together with the labor of other Asian peoples and Chicanos and Mexicans, Japanese labor contributed to the rapid growth of the nation's agricultural industry and other important areas of the economy. The wealth created by Japanese and other laborers contributed to the overall growth and consolidation of U.S. monopoly capitalism in the late 1800's. But while this backbreaking labor helped build this country, Japanese faced economic exploitation, hostility, violence and rejection. They suffered all-round oppression. Japanese were scorned by labor unions, though many Japanese fought militantly to better the lives of working people. Japanese children were not allowed to go to public schools. The media was constantly attacking and degrading Japanese people. Years later, even Japanese Americans who had a college degree could not find work in the civil service or in other professions. Other Japanese commonly worked in farming or in service industries as gardeners, housekeepers and other occupations. Because of segregation and hostility, Japanese established Nihonmachis or Japantowns for mutual support. The largest Japanese communities were in San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Jose and Sacramento in California, and in Portland and Seattle. All facets of life revolved around the community. Different kenjinkai or prefectural associations, cultural associations and the Buddhist churches kept cultural traditions alive in a hostile land. Many Japanese communities had their own press which was the sole source of news to most Issei. Little Tokyo and Nihonmachi became home for thousands of migrant male farm workers. Barber shops, restaurants, bath houses, hotels, small cafes and nomiya (bars) catered to the needs of the Japanese workers. In addition, legal and medical services were available for Japanese who would often journey in from the rural and outlying areas. Japanese developed into an oppressed national minority, restricted and exploited economically, socially and politically. They were prevented from gaining any foothold in this country. Japanese tilled the land but were barred from owning it. They settled here to live but weren't allowed to become citizens. And when they began to sink roots, the doors to further immigration were slammed shut by the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924. Over 500 pieces of anti-Japanese legislation were eventually passed. The fervent hope of the capitalists was that the Japanese, limited in numbers and restricted from having families, would eventually die out, saving the West Coast for the white race.

#### It was not solely a product of racism---the fundamental motives were economic

API, 12 [Asian American Movement Ezine, A history of the camps: Japanese American imprisonment during World War II, <http://www.apimovement.com/japanese-americans/history-camps-japanese-american-imprisonment-during-world-war>, jj]

Then there were the economic interests involved. Agricultural interests like California's Farm Labor Bureau and Associated Farmers coveted the fertile lands Japanese had created with their backbreaking labor. As a spokesperson for the growers and shippers said, "We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. We might as well be honest, we do. It's a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the Yellow man. If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them, because the white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows. And we don't want them back when the war ends, either."

#### Our alternative is to organize politics around unconditional resistance to capitalism & refuse the 1AC’s evacuation of universalism. This is a question of non-permutable starting points; only prior critical interrogation of economic relations lays the groundwork for radical politics

* Individualism warrant

**McLaren ‘06** (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, <http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm>, jj)

Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself. In other words, class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (*Totalitarianism* 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality* (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) but have done little to uncover its reality. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements (such as Laclau and Mouffe) want revolution without revolution; in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation (while often confusing and inconsistent) rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. The critical pedagogical act of interro-gating experiences is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle. History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?

### Case

#### narratives are a bad method:

#### Trading autobiographical narrative for the ballot commodifies one’s identity and has limited impact on the culture that one attempt’s to reform – when autobiographical narrative “wins,” it subverts its own most radical intentions by becoming an exemplar of the very culture under indictment

Coughlin 95—associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)

Although Williams is quick to detect insensitivity and bigotry in remarks made by strangers, colleagues, and friends, her taste for irony fails her when it comes to reflection on her relationship with her readers and the material benefits that her autobiographical performances have earned for her. n196 Perhaps Williams should be more inclined to thank, rather than reprimand, her editors for behaving as readers of autobiography invariably do. When we examine this literary faux pas - the incongruity between Williams's condemnation of her editors and the professional benefits their publication secured her - we detect yet another contradiction between the outsiders' use of autobiography and their desire to transform culture radically. Lejeune's characterization of autobiography as a "contract" reminds us that autobiography is a lucrative commodity. In our culture, members of the reading public avidly consume personal stories, n197 which surely explains why first-rate law journals and academic presses have been eager to market outsider narratives. No matter how unruly the self that it records, an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of "property in a moneyed economy" n198 and into a valuable intellectual [\*1283] asset in an academy that requires its members to publish. n199 Accordingly, we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor. n200

Certainly, publication of a best seller may transform its author's life, with the resulting commercial success and academic renown. n201 As one critic of autobiography puts it, "failures do not get published." n202 While writing a successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual author, this success has a limited impact on culture. Indeed, the transformation of outsider authors into "success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves to literary and academic consumers. n203 What good does this transformation do for outsiders who are less fortunate and less articulate than middle-class law professors? n204 Although they style themselves cultural critics, the [\*1284] storytellers generally do not reflect on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values they claim to resist. Rather, for the most part, they seem content simply to take advantage of the peculiarly American license, identified by Professor Sacvan Bercovitch, "to have your dissent and make it too." n205

IV. The Autobiographical Self

The outsider narratives do not reflect on another feature of autobiographical discourse that is perhaps the most significant obstacle to their goal to bring to law an understanding of the human self that will supersede the liberal individual. Contrary to the outsiders' claim that their personalized discourse infuses law with their distinctive experiences and political perspectives, numerous historians and critics of autobiography have insisted that those who participate in autobiographical discourse speak not in a different voice, but in a common voice that reflects their membership in a culture devoted to liberal values. n206 As Sacvan Bercovitch puts it, American cultural ideals, including specifically the mythic connection between the "heroic individual ... [and] the values of free enterprise," are "epitomized in autobiography." n207 In his seminal essay on the subject, Professor Georges Gusdorf makes an observation that seems like a prescient warning to outsiders who would appropriate autobiography as their voice. He remarks that the practice of writing about one's own self reflects a belief in the autonomous individual, which is "peculiar to Western man, a concern that has been of good use in his systematic conquest of the [\*1285] universe and that he has communicated to men of other cultures; but those men will thereby have been annexed by a sort of intellectual colonizing to a mentality that was not their own." n208 Similarly, Albert Stone, a critic of American autobiography, argues that autobiographical performances celebrate the Western ideal of individualism, "which places the self at the center of its world." n209 Stone begins to elucidate the prescriptive character of autobiographical discourse as he notes with wonder "the tenacious social ideal whose persistence is all the more significant when found repeated in personal histories of Afro-Americans, immigrants, penitentiary prisoners, and others whose claims to full individuality have often been denied by our society." n210

Precisely because it appeals to readers' fascination with the self-sufficiency, resiliency and uniqueness of the totemic individual privileged by liberal political theory, there is a risk that autobiographical discourse is a fallible, even co-opted, instrument for the social reforms envisioned by the outsiders. By affirming the myths of individual success in our culture, autobiography reproduces the [\*1286] political, economic, social and psychological structures that attend such success. n211 In this light, the outsider autobiographies unwittingly deflect attention from collective social responsibility and thwart the development of collective solutions for the eradication of racist and sexist harms. Although we may suspect in some cases that the author's own sense of self was shaped by a community whose values oppose those of liberal individualism, her decision to register her experience in autobiographical discourse will have a significant effect on the self she reproduces. n212 Her story will solicit the public's attention to the life of one individual, and it will privilege her individual desires and rights above the needs and obligations of a collectivity.

Moreover, literary theorists have remarked the tendency of autobiographical discourse to override radical authorial intention. Even where the autobiographer self-consciously determines to resist liberal ideology and represents her life story as the occasion to announce an alternative political theory, "the relentless individualism of the genre subordinates" her political critique. n213 Inevitably, at least within American culture, the personal narrative engrosses the readers' imagination. Fascinated by the travails and triumphs of the developing autobiographical self, readers tend to construe the text's political and social observations only as another aspect of the author's personality.

Paradoxically, although autobiography is the product of a culture that cultivates human individuality, the genre seems to make available only a limited number of autobiographical protagonists. n214 Many theorists have noticed that when an author assumes the task of defining her own, unique subjectivity, she invariably reproduces herself as a character with whom culture already is well-acquainted. n215 While a variety of forces coerce the autobiographer [\*1287] to conform to culturally sanctioned human models, n216 the pressures exerted by the literary market surely play a significant role. The autobiographer who desires a material benefit from her performance must adopt a persona that is intelligible, if not enticing, to her audience. n217 As I will illustrate in the sections that follow, the outsider narratives capitalize on, rather than subvert, autobiographical protagonists that serve the values of liberalism.

#### Performance is not a mode of resistance - it gives too much power to the audience because the performer is structurally blocked from controlling the (re)presentation of their representations. Appealing to the ballot is a way of turning over one’s identity to the same reproductive economy that underwrites liberalism

Phelan 96—chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies (Peggy, Unmarked: the politics of performance, ed published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, 146

Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity proposed here, becomes itself through disappearance.

The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to the laws of the reproductive economy are enormous. For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressed by the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occurs over a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, but this repetition itself marks it as “different.” The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present.

#### The very act of articulating why performance ought be attached to the ballot casts performance within the terms of liberalism’s discursive economy – this reduces their performance to a form of aesthetic formalism, this subordinates the political potential of performance to the narrow disciplinary concerns of academic knowledge production

Phelan ‘96—chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies (Peggy, Unmarked: the politics of performance, ed published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005,

In his 1981 article Representation and the Limits of Interpretation, Eric E. Peterson delves into the problems of wedding post-structuralism and interpretation in terms of the limits of representation. He concedes that for oral interpretation “representation is a powerful force in the theoretical understanding of our practice. Not only does it allow us to distinguish oral interpretation from similar literary, theatrical, and speech arts; but it also provides a theoretical justification for the existence of oral interpretation as a discipline distinct from other disciplines” (24). Peterson formulated these arguments even before oral interpretation shifted to the broader term performance studies, but his predictions were insightful. Peterson maps out potential disciplinary costs of thinking representation in a certain way. He continues, saying that the cost of “securing this place for oral interpretation is the increasing objectification of our practice and subjectification of our practitioners. By objectifying our practice, we mean that the conceptualization of art as representation precludes the examination of the very activity of representing” (24). This causes the field to continually wrap itself up in disciplinary techniques for the “accumulation of knowledge and the exercise of power” (24) through interpretation, instead of focusing on the eroticization of performance practice itself. Peterson argues for reinvestigating the process of performance as art, not subject-object relations.

#### Don’t fall prey to the 1AC’s appeal to lingering guilt over Korematsu---Overruling sanitizes history by removing the decision from the legacy of the Court. This process of whitewashing is analgous to the strategy of racial redemption wherein the court systematically removes the blood of oppression form its hands by burying its institutional history. The affirmative’s overrule enacts the burial feature by removing the decision from the lasting public view.

Sumi Cho, Depaul Law Professor, 1998 (Boston College Third World Law Journal, “Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of internment: Earl warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption” 19 B.C. Third World L.J. 73)

Racial redemption is the process by which whiteness can be restored to its full material value by removing the encumbrances that the legacy of racism has placed upon it. Such a process reconciles the knowledge/desire tension by denouncing supremacy while permitting its continued operation. Specifically, there are three identifiable features that characterize the process of racial redemption: 1) the repudiation of old forms of white supremacy; 2) the burial of historical memories of racial subordination; and 3) the transformation of white supremacy into more sustainable forms. The repudiation of America's supremacist past may take various forms, such as the declaration of racial apologies or racial equality "covenants." A number of historical events merged in the mid-twentieth century to force the repudiation of white supremacist regimes, only two of which I will address. First, the discovery of the Nazi death camps was an epiphanal moment for the United States and began the final demise of the pseudo-scientific, biologically-based philosophy of white supremacy. n251 The Holocaust held a mirror to white Americans' violent  [\*123]  exclusion and disfranchisement of people of color, particularly Black Americans in the South. In addition, the 1944 publication, *An American Dilemma*, removed the intellectual cover enjoyed by scientific racism. n252 In his thousand page work, Gunnar Myrdal argued that America's race problem was attributable not to the biological inferiority of the minority group, but to the irrational prejudices of members of the majority group. n253 The Holocaust, the public spectacle of the Nuremberg trials and the influence of *An American Dilemma* made it impossible to sustain old forms of white supremacy as a public rationale for the racial caste system in postwar America. n254 The burial feature of racial redemption makes use of censorship, historical amnesia, selective recall, euphemizing and revisionist historicizing in achieving its ends. This process obscures individual, institutional and cultural complicities with the old forms of white supremacy that would otherwise have left "blood on the hands" of those who participated in the repudiated regime, and even damaged the moral currency of those who passively benefited from it. In one sense, burial provides closure after a grieving period, granting permission to "move on" from the legacy of America's racist past. Such burials may manifest themselves as outright denials, glaring omissions, silences, absences and counter-factual or decontextualized assertions. Burial obscures the full extent to which white privilege has been consolidated and leveraged into material gain. n255 The third, and most important, feature of racial redemption involves the simultaneous transformation and reassertion of white supremacy.  [\*124]  The process of racial redemption retires an outmoded form of white supremacy while introducing a new, more resilient form. What has been billed as revolutionary racial change in the repudiation phase reveals itself as a "mere change in the form of investment" in white supremacy. n256 Burial of racial historical context makes it analytically difficult for the public to evaluate comparatively the evolving form of subordination. Pre-*Brown*, white supremacy manifested itself in the system of segregation supported by an ideology of biological determinism. Post-*Brown*, white supremacy continued in the new form of formal legal equality abutted by the ideology of colorblind fundamentalism.

#### Forgetting extermination is a form of extermination in itself – the overturning of the decision and subsequent forgetting of the Courts involvement is a political act of annihilation that must be rejected in lieu of a strategy of remembrance

Baudrillard, Professor of philosophy and Culture and media Criticism, 1995 (Simulacra and Sumulation, pg. 49-50)

Forgetting extermination is part of extermination, because it is also the extermination of memory, of history, of the social, etc. This forgetting is as essential as the event, in any case unlocatable by us, inaccessible to us in its truth. This forgetting is still too dangerous, it must be effaced by an artificial memory (today, everywhere, it is artificial memories that efface the memory of man, that efface man in his own memory). This artificial memory will be the restaging of extermination-but late, much too late for it to be able to make real waves and profoundly disturb something, and especially, especially through a.medium that is itself cold, radiating forgetfulness, deterrence, and extermination in a still more systematic way, if that is possible, than the camps themselves. One no longer makes the Jews pass through the crematorium or the gas chamber, but through the sound track and image track, through the universal screen and the microprocessor. Forgetting, annihilation, finally achieves its aesthetic dimension in this way-it is achieved in retro, finally elevated here to a mass level. Even the type of sociohistorical dimension that still remained forgotten in the form of guilt, of shameful latency, of the not-said, no longer exists, because now "everyone knows," everybody has trembled and bawled in the face of extermination-a sure sign that "that" will never again occur. But what one exorcises in this way at little cost,, and for the. price of a few tears, will never in effect be reproduced, because it has always been in the midst of currently reproducing itself, and precisely in the very form in which one pretends to denounce it, in the medium itself of this supposed exorcism: television. Same process of forgetting, of liquidation, of extermination, same annihilation of memories and of history, same inverse, implosive radiation, same absorption without an echo, same black hole as Auschwitz. And one would like to have us believe that TV will lift the weight of Auschwitz by making a collective awareness radiate, whereas television is its perpetuation in another guise, this time no longer under the aus­pices of a site of annihilation,.but of a medium of deterrence. What no one wants to understand is that Holocaust is primarily (and exclusively) an event, or, rather, a televised object (fundamental rule of McLuhan's, which must not be forgotten), that is to say, that one attempts to rekindle a cold historical event, tragic but cold, the first major event of cold systems, of cooling systems, of systems of deterrence and extermination that will then be deployed in other forms (including the cold war, etc.) and in regard to cold masses (the Jews no longer-even-concerned-with- :­their own death, and the eventually self-managed masses no longer even in revolt: deterred until death, deterred from their very own death) to rekindle this cold event through a cold medium, television, and for the masses who are themselves cold, who will only have the opportunity--for a tactile- thrill and a posthumous emotion, a deterrent thrill as well, which will make them spill into forgetting with a kind of good aesthetic conscience of the catastrophe.

#### Leaving the decisions on the books engenders strategies of resistance to new forms of oppression because the courts complicity in oppression is never forgotten.

Nikolas Kaprowski, Northwetser Law J.D Candidate, 2003(Seattle University Law Review, “Stacking the Deck Against Suspected Terrorists: The Dwindling Procedural Limits of the Government’s Power to Indefinitely Detain United States Citizens as Enemy Combatants, winter

Scholars have argued that many factors relating to the Quirin decision indicate that it is bad law and should not bind courts anymore. Two such scholars argue that "Quirin plainly fits the criteria typically offered for judicial confinement or reconsideration ... ." n169 In that sense, Quirin is comparable to Korematsu, decided two years later by virtually the same Court. n170 Like Quirin, Korematsu involved a situation where the Court's decision seemed to blatantly contradict express constitutional provisions but satisfied the government's security concerns in the middle of a war. Also like Quirin, Korematsu has never been expressly overruled and is still technically good law. However, Korematsu has drawn much more attention than Quirin. It has been almost universally condemned, and there is little doubt that it is of very little value as legal precedent.n171 In 1984, the Northern District of California overturned Fred Korematsu's conviction on a writ of coram nobis. n172 However, the court overturned the conviction on the facts rather than based on the law. The court found that "there was critical contradictory evidence known to the government and knowingly concealed from the courts" in Korematsu's original case. n173The court recognized that it was not within its authority to overrule the original Korematsu case on the law; "the Supreme Court's decision stands as the law of this case and for whatever precedential value it may still have." n174 The court concluded by noting: Korematsu remains on the pages of our legal and political history. As a legal precedent it is now recognized as having very limited application. As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees. n175

# 2NC

## Cap

### 2NC Top Level Overview

#### The role of the ballot is to unconditionally resist economic systems of exclusion—your primary directive as an ethical actor must be to insist on universal resistance to capitalism. This is a prior question to the 1AC—traditional impact calculus is impossible because capitalism anonymizes and mystifies its violent contradictions. That outweighs the aff EVEN IF they win full weight of their impact and the root cause debate—capitalism subsumes the oppression they outline and externally results in invisible violence against billions globally. That’s Zizek and Daly. This question of self-orientation comes first

**Johnston ’04** (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)

The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, **given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism,** he sees **the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the** first crucial step **that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better.** In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that **Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action** (thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") **must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.**

#### Try-or-die---capitalism’s reduction of life to mere economic worth guarantees annihilation—turns 1AC Gady ev

**Dillon ’99**(Michael, Professor of IR @ Lancaster, “Another Justice” *Political Theory*, Vol. 27, No. 2. April, pp. 165)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. **The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.** They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. **Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability**.3s Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. **Once rendered calculable**, however, **units of account are necessarily submissible** not only to valuation but also, of course, **to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing.** Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. **There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust**. **However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."**

### ROB A2 – Social Location

#### Their role of the ballot is a link to our K and impact turned by it

#### Grounding politics in social location prevents comprehensive analysis of SOCIAL RELATIONS as a totality—causes a “snapshot” approach to understanding oppression that blocks class struggle

* snapshot

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Early attempts to develop a materialist, anti-racist feminism from a Marxian perspective foundered on the rocky shores of structuralism and economic reductionism—their end signaled in Heidi Hartmann’s 1979 critique, “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism.” Many years later, and only after a detour through a postmodern, Foucauldian landscape, progressive feminists have embraced a new comprehensive materialist approach, intersectionality. Insisting that any given social moment embodies a historically specific nexus of institutionalized relations of class, race, gender, etc., intersectionality overcomes many of the weaknesses associated with early Marxist feminism. Most importantly, it shifts the goal of analysis away from isolating and 2 ranking particular forms of oppression, and toward interrogating the manner in which they reinforce and/or contradict one another in and through people’s lived experiences. This has the decided merit of exploring subjectivities, of focusing analysis on people’s lives, not just abstract categories of race, gender and class. Yet, as Johanna Brenner argues, scholars who have adopted an intersectional perspective tend to limit their field of inquiry. They usually set out to describe and explain how specified social locations shape experience and identity, rather than to understand how such locations interact as part of a dynamic set of social relations. Such a snapshot approach doesn’t adequately probe the question of capitalism as a social power—the question, that is, of how processes, ideas and institutions associated with race, gender and class act upon each other to both reproduce and challenge the exclusions, inequality and exploitation characteristic of capitalist class societies. As a result, they often leave capitalist relations of social power, and resistance to that power under-theorized (Brenner, 2000:293).

#### Only the alt’s holistic focus on social relations rather than particular locations can create unified resistance --- also a DA to intersectionality

Susan Ferguson ’08, is Assistant Professor in the Journalism Program at the Wilfrid Laurier University, Brantford Campus. Her previous work on feminist theory and politics explores the development of the social reproduction framework in the Canadian context. Current research interests include applying that framework to media and children's culture. Race, Gender & Class: Volume 15, Number 1-2, 2008 (42-57), CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL REPRODUCTION FEMINISM, RACE AND EMBODIED LABOR, <http://davidmcnally.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Race-Gender-Class.pdf>, jj

When Brenner critiques intersectionality for its focus on social location as opposed to social relations, she is pointing out that many intersectional analyses fail to connect their descriptively rich accounts to that broader “unity.” Identifying nexuses of oppression and probing their inner workings has the advantage of “starting from experience,” and thus is a clear advance on structuralist political economy. But the most such analyses can do is highlight similarities and differences amongst discrete instances of oppression, and explain those oppressions in terms of contingent economic and cultural forces (state policies, policing practices, or the culture of whiteness, for example). To move beyond this, as Bannerji suggests, involves investigating how these experiences are socially mediated—that is, the way in which various social locations arise in a shared social space, a space shaped by certain colonial capitalist exigencies. A revised and expanded SRF framework conceptualizes those intersectional nexuses as products of labor—of creative activity undertaken to reproduce ourselves within this shared space. This, in turn, highlights not only the ways in which we partake in a broader set of social relations—relations that, because of the alienated form of much of our labor, often end up dominating us—but also the embodied nature of that activity, the biophysical differentiation and spatial location of the laboring body that, under conditions of capitalist reproduction, inscribe that body with both gender and race. As a result, real and systemic connections between the endlessly varied struggles of the oppressed become apparent, between, for instance, a childcare worker strike in Vancouver, the struggle to protect schooling for girls in Kabul and the environmental movement against mega-dams along India’s River Narmada.

#### Narration is not radical—allows for self-realization as long as fundamental economic structures are not questioned

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Capital seeks ever new territories. Every time a new ‘narration’ appears, new options for capitalisation open up. So, perhaps gays and lesbians do not reproduce a classical patriarchal structure. No problem! You can always produce clothing, magazines, open bars, shops, and other stuff with a particular focus on this target group. In other words, capitalism is doing fine without a homogenising super - structure. It needs no truth and no history with a capital H. Capitalism lives from the particular and the multitude in the myriads of cultur - ally defined sub groupings. What we buy in the market is not so much material objects as it is experiences and identity: Michel Foucault’s notion of turning one’s Self itself into a work of art thus finds unexpected confirmation: I buy my bodily fit - ness by visiting fitness clubs; I buy my spiritual enlightenment by enrolling in transcendental meditation courses; I buy my public persona by going to restaurants frequented by people with whom I want to be associated. (Žižek 2002b: 287) For many, this multitude is the source of new liberties as an opportu-nity to create oneself; finally the yoke of uniformity has been lifted from our shoulders. One could of course focus on the rapid change, but it is easy to forget that behind this production of difference lies the logic of capital. We can realise ourselves as much as we like, as long as we do not question the most fundamental order (Žižek 2001a: 122). The freedom to realise oneself is therefore a very restricted kind of freedom. It is the freedom to choose between Jay Leno and David Letterman or between Coke and Pepsi.

#### Narratives of suffering play into the hands of the existing order. They cannot challenge the fundamental components of the political fantasy because they are focused on victimization, not real political challenges.

Žižek 1 (Slavoj, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, president of the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis, Interview with Christopher Hanlon, Ph.D. from UMass-Amherst, “Psychoanalysis and the Post-Political: An Interview with Slavoj Žižek,” New Literary History, 32.1, 1-21, Project Muse).

**SZ:** Well, I don't think that . . . OK, Cornel West did say that. But I nonetheless don't think that he perceives us as the main opponent. Because this very reproach that you mention is not a reproach that can be addressed specifically to Lacan. My idea is the old marxist idea that this immediate reference to experience, practice, struggle, etcetera, usually relies on the most abstract and pure theory, and as an old philosopher I would say, as you said before, that we simply cannot escape theory. I fanatically oppose this turn which has taken place in social theory, this idea that there is no longer time for great theoretical projects, that all we can do is narrativize the experience of our suffering, that all various ethnic or sexual groups can ultimately do is to narrate their painful, traumatic experience. I think **this is a catastrophe**. I think that **this fits perfectly the existing capitalist order,** that **there is nothing subversive in it.** I think that **this fits perfectly today's ideology of victimization, where in order** to legitimize**, to gain power politically, you must present yourself,** somehow, **as the victim**.

### Turns

#### Explains appropriation of Japanese

#### Their historical analysis is faulty--Capitalism predetermined Japanese interment and oppression

API, 12 [Asian American Movement Ezine, A history of the camps: Japanese American imprisonment during World War II, <http://www.apimovement.com/japanese-americans/history-camps-japanese-american-imprisonment-during-world-war>, jj]

In order to understand how the camps ever could have happened in the first place, we must look back upon the history of Japanese people prior to World War II. The first point of entry was Hawaii, which had been colonized by U.S. capitalists. In 1868 a group of Japanese contract laborers arrived to work the sugar and pineapple plantations. After the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, the U.S. capitalists, looking for a new source of cheap labor, pressured the Japanese government to allow its workers to emigrate. The early immigrants came over mainly as contract laborers and worked as migrant farm workers in the fields, orchards and vineyards of the West Coast. Others worked on section gangs on the railroad lines of the Great Northern Pacific and Central Pacific or in the Alaskan canneries, and the copper and coal mines of Utah and Colorado. These workers were greatly exploited by the capitalists. For example, Japanese railroad workers on the Northern Pacific labored in the bitter cold for less than $1 a day. Together with the labor of other Asian peoples and Chicanos and Mexicans, Japanese labor contributed to the rapid growth of the nation's agricultural industry and other important areas of the economy. The wealth created by Japanese and other laborers contributed to the overall growth and consolidation of U.S. monopoly capitalism in the late 1800's. But while this backbreaking labor helped build this country, Japanese faced economic exploitation, hostility, violence and rejection. They suffered all-round oppression. Japanese were scorned by labor unions, though many Japanese fought militantly to better the lives of working people. Japanese children were not allowed to go to public schools. The media was constantly attacking and degrading Japanese people. Years later, even Japanese Americans who had a college degree could not find work in the civil service or in other professions. Other Japanese commonly worked in farming or in service industries as gardeners, housekeepers and other occupations. Because of segregation and hostility, Japanese established Nihonmachis or Japantowns for mutual support. The largest Japanese communities were in San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Jose and Sacramento in California, and in Portland and Seattle. All facets of life revolved around the community. Different kenjinkai or prefectural associations, cultural associations and the Buddhist churches kept cultural traditions alive in a hostile land. Many Japanese communities had their own press which was the sole source of news to most Issei. Little Tokyo and Nihonmachi became home for thousands of migrant male farm workers. Barber shops, restaurants, bath houses, hotels, small cafes and nomiya (bars) catered to the needs of the Japanese workers. In addition, legal and medical services were available for Japanese who would often journey in from the rural and outlying areas. Japanese developed into an oppressed national minority, restricted and exploited economically, socially and politically. They were prevented from gaining any foothold in this country. Japanese tilled the land but were barred from owning it. They settled here to live but weren't allowed to become citizens. And when they began to sink roots, the doors to further immigration were slammed shut by the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924. Over 500 pieces of anti-Japanese legislation were eventually passed. The fervent hope of the capitalists was that the Japanese, limited in numbers and restricted from having families, would eventually die out, saving the West Coast for the white race.

#### It was not solely a product of racism---the fundamental motives were economic

API, 12 [Asian American Movement Ezine, A history of the camps: Japanese American imprisonment during World War II, <http://www.apimovement.com/japanese-americans/history-camps-japanese-american-imprisonment-during-world-war>, jj]

Then there were the economic interests involved. Agricultural interests like California's Farm Labor Bureau and Associated Farmers coveted the fertile lands Japanese had created with their backbreaking labor. As a spokesperson for the growers and shippers said, "We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. We might as well be honest, we do. It's a question of whether the white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the Yellow man. If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them, because the white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows. And we don't want them back when the war ends, either."

### 1NC – Impact – Turns Modern Racism

#### We can agree root cause focus is bad and win the debate--Forget the chicken and the egg historical debate about Korematsu---Modern Racism is no longer based on ideologies of cultural or natural superiority - economic egotism is the root of modern racism

Zizek 2008 Slavoj Violence p 101-104

But we are not dealing here only with good old racism. Something more is at stake: a fundamental feature of our emerging “global” society. On ii September 2001 the Twin Towers were hit. Twelve years earlier, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. That date heralded the “happy ‘9os,” the Francis Fukuyama dream of the “end of history” —the belief that liberal democracy had, in principle, won; that the search was over; that the advent of a global, liberal world community lurked just around the corner; that the obstacles to this ultra-Hollywood happy ending were merely empirical and contingent (local pockets of resistance where the leaders did not yet grasp that their time was up). In contrast, 9/11 is the main symbol of the end of the Clintonite happy ‘9os. This is the era in which new walls emerge everywhere, between Israel and the West Bank, around the European Union, on the U.S.—Mexico border. The rise of the populist New Right is just the most prominent example of the urge to raise new walls. A couple of years ago, an ominous decision of the European Union passed almost unnoticed: the plan to establish an all-European border police force to secure the isolation of Union territory and thus to prevent the influx of immigrants. *This* is the truth of globalisation: the construction of new walls safeguarding prosperous Europe from the immigrant flood. One is tempted to resuscitate here the old Marxist “humanist” opposition of “relations between things” and “relations between persons”: in the much-celebrated free circulation opened up by global capitalism, it is “things” (commodities) which freely circulate, while the circulation of “persons” is more and more controlled. We are not dealing now with “globalisation” as an unfinished project but with a true “dialectics of globalisation”: the segregation of the people *is* the reality of economic globalisation. This new racism of the developed is in a way much more brutal than the previous ones: its implicit legitimisation is neither naturalist (the “natural” superiority of the developed West) nor any longer culturalist (we in the West also want to preserve our cultural identity), but unabashed economic egotism. The fundamental divide is one between those included in the sphere of (relative) economic prosperity and those excluded from it.

### A2: ID Politics Good

#### They cannot win uniqueness – Capital will constantly annihilate the particular

Dean, Associate Professor of Political Theory at Hobart & William Smith, 2005

Jodi, Zizek against Democracy, jdeanicite.typepad.com/i\_cite/files/zizek\_against\_ democracy\_new\_version.doc –

To summarize: Zizek argues that the democratic form runs up against a stain or non-universalizable kernel. Using Lacan, he understands this kernel as a stain of enjoyment, of an irreducible attachment to an intense pleasure-pain. The empty place of democracy is never fully empty. It comes up against points of non-universalizability—founding violence, ethnic particularity, the national Thing. Indeed, insofar as democracy has been a project of the Nation, its very starting point, its position of enunciation, requires this non-universalizable kernel. To the extent that liberal democracy tries to eliminate this stain, tries to exclude ethic fundamentalism and nationalist attachment, it necessarily fails. And, under conditions of late capitalism, the problem is even worse. Like liberal democracy, Capital wants to eliminate particular attachments. Liberal-democratic attacks on ethnic fundamentalism, then, serve capitalist ends at they attack some of the few remaining sites of opposition to capitalism. Nationalist, ethnic, racist violence thus persists today at the intersection of two modes of failed universalization—democracy and capitalism. The question is whether a new political universality is possible.

### 2NC Link

#### Narrativization of suffering in the debate space is an empty act of tolerance that ensures that nothing really changes

-root of oppression is individual intolerance --- ignores fundamentally economic antangonisms

-empty gesture – he talked about his family, which was really interesting, and empowering I’m sure – but then what? It’s creates the illusion of radicalism and change when really it’s just us sitting in a classroom doing nothing! The endpoint of politics becomes ensuring everyone has a right to tell their story rather than asking why they were unable to tell their story in the first place

Zizek 8—Institute for Social Sciences, Ljubljana (Slavoj, The Prospects of Radical Politics Today, Int’l Journal of Baudrillard Studies, 5;1)

ellipses in orig

Let us take two predominant topics of to day's American radical academia: postcolonial and queer (gay) studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, "postcolonial studies" tend to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities' "right to narrate" their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms which repress "otherness," so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other, and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves. The politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas ... The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included – up to a point), but conceptual: notions of "European" critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of Cultural Studies chic.

My personal experience is that practically all of the "radical" academics silently count on the long-term stability of the American capitalist model, with the secure tenured position as their ultimate professional goal (a surprising number of them even play on the stock market). If there is a thing they are gen­uinely horrified of, it is a radical shattering of the (relatively) safe life environ­ment of the "symbolic classes" in the developed Western societies. Their excessive Politically Correct zeal when dealing with sexism, racism, Third World sweatshops, etc., is thus ultimately a defense against their own innermost identi­fication, a kind of compulsive ritual whose hidden logic is: "Let's talk as much as possible about the necessity of a radical change to make sure that nothing will really change!" Symptomatic here is the journal October: when you ask one of the editors to what the title refers, they will half-confidentially signal that it is, of course, that October – in this way, one can indulge in the jargonistic analyses of modern art, with the hidden assurance that one is somehow retaining the link with the radical revolutionary past ... With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture toward Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise: they at least play their game straight and are honest in their acceptance of global capitalist coordinates, in contrast to the pseudo-radical academic Leftists who adopt toward the Third Way the attitude of utter disdain, while their own radi­cality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture which obligates no one to any­thing determinate.

II. From Human to Animal Rights

We live in the "postmodern" era in which truth­ claims as such are dismissed as an expression of hidden power mechanisms – as the reborn pseudo-Nietzscheans like to emphasize, truth is a lie which is most efficient in asserting our will to power. The very question "Is it true?" apropos of some statement is supplanted by another question: "Under what power con­ditions can this statement be uttered?" What we get instead of the universal truth is a multitude of perspectives, or, as it is fashionable to put it today, of "narratives" – not only of literature, but also of politics, religion, science, they are all different narratives, stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, and the ultimate goal of ethics is to guarantee the neutral space in which this multitude of narratives can peacefully coexist, in which everyone, from ethnic to sexual minorities, will have the right and possibility to tell his/her story. The two philosophers of today's global capitalism are the two great Left-liberal "progres­sives," Richard Rorty and Peter Singer – honest in their respective stances. Rorty defines the basic coordinates: the fundamental dimension of a human being is the ability to suffer, to experience pain and humiliation – consequently, since humans are symbolic animals, the fundamental right is the right to nar­rate one's experience of suffering and humiliation.2 Singer then provides the Darwinian background.3

### \*\*\*\*A2: Perm

#### Identity politics makes the realization of a true universal impossible—the 1AC’s obsession with exposing marginalized viewpoints makes short-circuits universalism

* Liberal politics as usual

Zizek, ’09 (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, professor at the European Graduate School, and total BAMF, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, p. 102, bgm)

***\*e tutti quanit = all the rest***

Liberals who acknowledge the problems of those excluded from the socio-political process formulate their goal as being the inclusion of those whose voices are not heard: all positions should be listened to, all interests taken into account, the human rights of everyone guaranteed, all ways of life, cultures, and practices respected, and so on. The obsession of this democratic discourse is the protection of all kinds of minorities: cultural, religious, sexual, *e tutti quanti*. The formula of democracy is patient negotiation and compromise. What gets lost here is the proletarian position, the position of universality embodied in the Excluded. This is why, upon a closer look, it becomes clear that what Hugo Chavez has begun doing in Venezuela differs markedly from the standard liberal form of inclusion: Chavez is not including the “excluded” dwellers of favelas as his *base* and then reorganizing political space and political forms so that the latter will “fit” the excluded. Pedantic and abstract as it may appear, this difference—between “bourgeois democracy” and “dictatorship of the proletariat” —is crucial.

#### Revolution must take the working class as its point of departure—identity politics are inherently reactionary because they are a struggle for positions of power within the current social matrix rather than the struggle for a radical new symbolic order

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Much Marxism has been stuck in the idea that any revolutionary change has to take the working class as its point of departure. The ‘ideal’ has been dirty, hard working industrial workers. It has been discussed whether small, private farmers were poor enough; whether one could be progressive, if one had changed from overalls to a suit. The central point for Žižek, however, is not the particular attributes of a certain group, but its placement in relation to the whole of capi -talism. The proletariat for Marx is the symbol of a universal human -ity – and as such it points towards a society beyond exploitation and humiliation. For Žižek, the important point is not whether the prole - tariat was or is the most suppressed class, but whether its existence embodies the internal contradictions and imbalances of capitalism. One must therefore distinguish between the working class as a social group (as placed within the social matrix, as majority) and the pro -letariat as an agent, which in a militant way struggles for ‘universal truth’ (as the group that breaks with the social matrix, as minority) (Žižek 1999: 226f). There is no necessary connection between these two groups. The crucial point is therefore whether one is answering to the idea of a system beyond the exploitation and impoverishment of capitalism, or whether one is fighting for one’s own privileges. Should the struggle be understood as a struggle for positions within the same social matrix, or is the struggle a struggle for a new and radically different society? Class struggle is not initially a struggle between classes, but rather a struggle to cover up or make apparent the flaws and inconsistencies of capitalism. The danger of perceiving class struggle as the strug - gle for recognition and rights, for example, is that it thereby supports fixed identities and social roles – and in effect capitalism as a system. Class struggle and classes themselves are not that which all social phenomena can be reduced to, but rather a generative matrix that conditions the different ideological horizons, through which society is attributed meaning (Žižek 2002b: 190). [A] class society in which the ideological perception of the class division was pure and direct would be a harmonious structure with no struggle – or to put it in Laclau’s terms, class antagonism would thereby be fully symbolized; it would no longer be impossible/real, but a simple differential structural feature. (Žižek 1999: 187) Žižek’s view of the proletariat is strongly inspired by Hegel’s thoughts of the Lumpenproletariat . This group was exactly charac - terised by not being contemplated as a class sui generis . For Žižek, similarly, the proletariat is the group that does not fit into the capital - ist whole. Revolutionary struggle is therefore not a struggle for more salary, for instance, as such a struggle will only make certain dis - placements within a given system possible. Any political act that is taking its point of departure in particular identities and their demands – whether they be ethnic, religious, sexual or simply different life - styles – remains reactionary (Žižek 2003: 132f). Revolutionary strug - gle, on the contrary, questions the symbolic itself – the fact that the being of the worker is reduced to a commodity.

### Link – Intersectionality

#### Class must be recognized as qualitatively the most important oppression—otherwise the system is able to satisfy demands on grounds of formal equality, destroying attempts to overcome capitalist oppression.

Giminez, ’01 [Martha, Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: <http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html>]  
  
There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. **This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory**, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9). I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). **Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it.** Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered." In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). **Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators** (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). **Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher** (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, **class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression**. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. **The working class**, on the other hand**, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital** and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). **While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged**. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. **The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth**, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. **In so far as** the **"class"** in RGC **remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential.** Nevertheless, **I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument** not only **on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change** but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that **some power relations are more important and consequential than others**. **For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former**. In my view, **the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations.** In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression**, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination**. **Class relations** -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- **are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them.** **Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers.** **Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances.** **To argue**, then, **that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.**

### \*\*\*A2: General Marx/Cap Focus Bad Args – Top Level

#### Marxism doesn’t ignore race – just places a different causality

Taylor 11 [Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, on the editorial board of the International Socialist Review and a doctoral student in African American Studies at Northwestern University; “Race, class and Marxism,” SocialistWorker.org, <http://socialistworker.org/2011/01/04/race-class-and-marxism>]

Marxists believe that the potential for that kind of unity is dependant on battles and struggles against racism today. Without a commitment by revolutionary organizations in the here and now to the fight against racism, working-class unity will never be achieved and the revolutionary potential of the working class will never be realized. Yet despite all the evidence of this commitment to fighting racism over many decades, Marxism has been maligned as, at best, "blind" to combating racism and, at worst, "incapable" of it. For example, in an article published last summer, popular commentator and self-described "anti-racist" Tim Wise summarized the critique of "left activists" that he later defines as Marxists. He writes: [L]eft activists often marginalize people of color by operating from a framework of extreme class reductionism, which holds that the "real" issue is class, not race, that "the only color that matters is green," and that issues like racism are mere "identity politics," which should take a backseat to promoting class-based universalism and programs to help working people. This reductionism, by ignoring the way that even middle class and affluent people of color face racism and color-based discrimination (and by presuming that low-income folks of color and low-income whites are equally oppressed, despite a wealth of evidence to the contrary) reinforces white denial, privileges white perspectivism and dismisses the lived reality of people of color. Even more, as we'll see, it ignores perhaps the most important political lesson regarding the interplay of race and class: namely, that the biggest reason why there is so little working-class consciousness and unity in the Untied States (and thus, why class-based programs to uplift all in need are so much weaker here than in the rest of the industrialized world), is precisely because of racism and the way that white racism has been deliberately inculcated among white working folks. Only by confronting that directly (rather than sidestepping it as class reductionists seek to do) can we ever hope to build cross-racial, class based coalitions. In other words, for the policies favored by the class reductionist to work--be they social democrats or Marxists--or even to come into being, racism and white supremacy must be challenged directly. Here, Wise accuses Marxism of: "extreme class reductionism," meaning that Marxists allegedly think that class is more important than race; reducing struggles against racism to "mere identity politics"; and requiring that struggles against racism should "take a back seat" to struggles over economic issues. Wise also accuses so-called "left activists" of reinforcing "white denial" and "dismiss[ing] the lived reality of people of color"--which, of course, presumes Left activists and Marxists to all be white. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - What do Marxists actually say? Marxists argue that capitalism is a system that is based on the exploitation of the many by the few. Because it is a system based on gross inequality, it requires various tools to divide the majority--racism and all oppressions under capitalism serve this purpose. Moreover, oppression is used to justify and "explain" unequal relationships in society that enrich the minority that live off the majority's labor. Thus, racism developed initially to explain and justify the enslavement of Africans--because they were less than human and undeserving of liberty and freedom. Everyone accepts the idea that the oppression of slaves was rooted in the class relations of exploitation under that system. Fewer recognize that **under capitalism, wage slavery is the pivot around which all other inequalities and oppressions turn**. Capitalism used racism to justify plunder, conquest and slavery, but as Karl Marx pointed out, it also used racism to divide and rule--to pit one section of the working class against another and thereby blunt class consciousness. **To claim**, as Marxists do, **that racism is a product of capitalism is not to deny** or diminish **its importance** or impact in American society. It is simply to explain its origins and the reasons for its perpetuation. Many on the left today talk about class as if it is one of many oppressions, often describing it as "classism." What people are really referring to as "classism" is elitism or snobbery, and not the fundamental organization of society under capitalism. Moreover, it is popular today to talk about various oppressions, including class, as intersecting. While it is true that oppressions can reinforce and compound each other, they are born out of the material relations shaped by capitalism and the economic exploitation that is at the heart of capitalist society. In other words, it is the material and economic structure of society that gave rise to a range of ideas and ideologies to justify, explain and help perpetuate that order. In the United States, racism is the most important of those ideologies. Despite the widespread beliefs to the contrary of his critics, Karl Marx himself was well aware of the centrality of race under capitalism. While Marx did not write extensively on the question of slavery and its racial impact in societies specifically, he did write about the way in which European capitalism emerged because of its pilfering, rape and destruction, famously writing: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of Black skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. He also recognized the extent to which slavery was central to the world economy. He wrote: Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that has given the colonies their value; it is the colonies that have created world trade, and it is world trade that is the pre-condition of large-scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance. Without slavery North America, the most progressive of countries, would be transformed into a patriarchal country. Wipe out North America from the map of the world, and you will have anarchy--the complete decay of modern commerce and civilization. Cause slavery to disappear and you will have wiped America off the map of nations. Thus slavery, because it is an economic category, has always existed among the institutions of the peoples. Modern nations have been able only to disguise slavery in their own countries, but they have imposed it without disguise upon the New World. Thus, there is a fundamental understanding of the centrality of slave labor in the national and international economy. But what about race? Despite the dearth of Marx's own writing on race in particular, one might look at Marx's correspondence and deliberations on the American Civil War to draw conclusions as to whether Marx was as dogmatically focused on purely economic issues as his critics make him out be. One must raise the question: If Marx was reductionist, how is his unabashed support and involvement in abolitionist struggles in England explained? If Marx was truly an economic reductionist, he might have surmised that slavery and capitalism were incompatible, and simply waited for slavery to whither away. W.E.B. Du Bois in his Marxist tome Black Reconstruction, quotes at length a letter penned by Marx as the head of the International Workingmen's Association, written to Abraham Lincoln in 1864 in the midst of the Civil War: The contest for the territories which opened the epoch, was it not to decide whether the virgin soil of immense tracts should be wedded to the labor of the immigrant or be prostituted by the tramp of the slaver driver? When an oligarchy of 300,000 slave holders dared to inscribe for the first time in the annals of the world "Slavery" on the banner of armed revolt, when on the very spots where hardly a century ago the idea of one great Democratic Republic had first sprung up, whence the first declaration of the rights of man was issued...when on the very spots counter-revolution...maintained "slavery to be a beneficial institution"...and cynically proclaimed property in man 'the cornerstone of the new edifice'...then the working classes of Europe understood at once...that the slaveholders' rebellion was to sound the tocsin for a general holy war of property against labor... They consider it an earnest sign of the epoch to come that it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggles for the rescue of the enchained race and the Reconstruction of a social order. Not only was Marx personally opposed to slavery and actively organized against it, but he theorized that slavery and the resultant race discrimination that flowed from it were not just problems for the slaves themselves, but for white workers who were constantly under the threat of losing work to slave labor. This did not mean white workers were necessarily sympathetic to the cause of the slaves--most of them were not. But Marx was not addressing the issue of consciousness, but objective factors when he wrote in Capital, "In the United States of America, every independent movement of the workers was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic. Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the Black it is branded." Moreover, Marx understood the dynamics of racism in a modern sense as well--as a means by which workers who had common, objective interests with each other could also become mortal enemies because of subjective, but nevertheless real, racist and nationalist ideas. Looking at the tensions between Irish and English workers, with a nod toward the American situation between Black and white workers, Marx wrote: Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude is much the same as that of the "poor whites" to the "niggers" in the former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it. Out of this quote, one can see a Marxist theory of how racism operated in contemporary society, after slavery was ended. Marx was highlighting three things: first, that capitalism promotes economic competition between workers; second, that the ruling class uses racist ideology to divide workers against each other; and finally, that when one group of workers suffer oppression, it negatively impacts the entire class.

#### This is Interpassivity – denouncing our politics as “totalizing” conceals an individualistic politics that valorizes difference and remains content with endless minor reforms

Dean ’11 [Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “What is to be done? (4)”, <http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/2011/02/what-is-to-be-done.html>]

1. Lenin: "The worst sin we commit is that we degrade our political and organizational tasks to the level of the immediate, 'palpable,' 'concrete' interests of the everyday economic struggle; yet they singing to us the same refrain: Lend the economic struggle itself a political character!" Sometime I find it so strange, so puzzling, that the spontaneity, immediacy, concreteness, amateurism, and emphasis on the everyday that Lenin condemns as primitivism and economism is taken so widely for granted among so many left activists and intellectuals. Is this uncritical acceptance a reaction to what many see as the mistakes of the Soviet period? Is it a more recent response to the failures and compromises of communist parties in other countries (I'm thinking mostly of Italy here)? Is it a reaction to the rigidity of some communists in the US and the UK, a reaction by those who associate themselves with a new left? Or are other explanations equally or even more compelling--absorption of a 100 years of anti-communism, cooptation by the pleasures of capitalism, relief through forfeiture of responsibility for the terribly hard work of organizing? So many strands of intellectual ideology converge: don't speak for another, appreciate differences, celebrate locality. It's no wonder that a politics can't emerge. Dogmatism, demands, and organization are discounted in advance.I should put this differently. There is a politics here: an individualist politics whose sole principle is that of individual freedom, where this freedom is reduced to particular choice and decision, even as it blocks access to organized contestation and rebuilding of the conditions of choice and decision. Did I choose to live in a society where security is privatized, where required home and car insurance is subject to a market and a set of corporations whose interest is in profit and not my well-being? Did I choose to live in a society where wealth is held in more esteem than fairness, creativity, or scientific curiosity? Did I have a choice to live in a society where a collective good like space exploration is subordinated to tax breaks for the top one percent? 2. For Lenin, mass movement and "professional revolutionaries" are not alternative organizational forms. Each is necessary: Such workers, average people of the masses, are capable of displaying enormous energy and self-sacrifice in strikes and in street battles with the police and the troops, and are capable (in fact are alone capable) of determining the outcome of our entire movement--but the struggle against the political police requires special qualities; it requires professional revolutionaries. Lenin gives one reason for the need of professional revolutionaries--the police make every strike and every demonstration a secret. They prevent news of the strikes from spreading. Do we have the same problem? Cutting of Internet services in Egypt suggests a contemporary version of this kind of policing role, as do the attacks on journalists and the disruptions of Al Jazeera's signals. Yet news from Cairo was getting out and it was circulating in the country, even more, news of the struggles in multiple cities reinforced the struggles' as dimensions of one struggle. No one will deny that Egypt has been under authoritarian rule for decades. It's not surprising, then, that there are resonances with Russian at the beginning of the 20th century. The situation of the US, UK, and Europe under communicative capitalism suggests a different problem. The effect of the police--non knowledge of strikes and resistance--is achieved differently, now via over-kill, deluge, distraction, and obfuscation. Too much information becomes too little. Too much analysis and commentary deflects and displaces. The culture of media circulates and redirects energies away from direct confrontation. No wonder turning off the internet in Egypt had energizing effects--people had to get information from each other on the streets.

## Case

***And it solves better than the aff – attempts to create recognition through competitive debate are structurally flawed – there are no written records of decisions and little collective memory of what happened in any given debate***

**Atchison and Panetta, 09** (Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009) p. 317-334)

In addition to the structural problems, **the collective forgetfulness of the debate community reduces the impact that individual debates have** on the community. The debate community is largely made up of participants who debate and then move on to successful careers. The coaches and **directors that make up the backbone of the community are the people with the longest cultural memory, but they are also a small minority of the community** when considering the number of debaters involved in the activity. This is not meant to suggest that the activity is reinvented every year-certainly there are conventions that are passed down from coaches to debaters and from debaters to debaters. However, the basic fact remains that **there are virtually no transcriptions available for the community to read**, and, therefore, it is difficult to substantiate the claim that the debate community can remember anyone individual debate over the course of several generations of debaters. Additionally, given the focus on competition and individual skill, the community is more likely to remember the accomplishments and talents of debaters rather than a specific winning argument. **The debate community does not have the necessary components in place for a strong collective memory of individual debates**. The combination of the structures of debate and the collective forgetfulness means that any strategy for creating community change that is premised on winning individual debates is less effective than seeking a larger community dialogue that is recorded and/or transcribed. A second problem with attempting to create community change in individual debates is that **the debate community is comprised of more individuals than the four debaters and one judge that are present in every round. Coaches and directors have very little space for engaging in a discussion about community issues.** This is especially true for coaches and directors who are not preferred judges and, therefore, do not have access to many debates. Coaches and **directors should have a public forum to engage in a community conversation with debaters instead of attempting to take on their opponents through the wins and losses** of their own debaters.

***1.) Alliance splitting – personalizing debate risks splitting alliances and fracturing solutions, causing backlash and resistance***

**Zompetti ‘4** Joseph P. Zompetti (Assistant Professor, School of Communication, Illinois State University) “PERSONALIZING DEBATING: DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE IN THE DEBATE COMMUNITY” September 2004 Contemporary Argumentation and Debate volume 25

**The purpose of this essay is to outline what I strongly believe is a fundamental problem with recent debate techniques – the personalizing of debating**. The intent is not to isolate or overly criticize the arguments advanced by the University of Louisville specifically, but rather to locate their arguments as a case study for how debate rounds have become highly personalized. Even before Louisville's project (and certainly Louisville is not the only team that currently engages in this type of debating), **individuals and groups alike were personalizing debate arguments, making it difficult for opponents and judges to decipher, understand, analyze and come to grips with such arguments in a forum meant for hypothetical policy-making**. In essence, **the personalizing of debating has emerged wrought with frustrations, anxiety, resistance and backlash**. To be sure, many have embraced the idea to gain a strategic edge in competitive debate rounds as well as to be self-reflexive of their own participation in an activity that probably does need restructuring. However, the central problem of this new phenomenon – the personalizing of debating – is twofold: it victimizes debate, and it ignores deeper, perhaps more important structural problems within the debate community.

***2.) Structural solutions – shifting community problems to debate rounds turns their movement solely into a means to win and ignores more structural problems***

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# 1NR

## Cap

### Perm

#### Revolution must take the working class as its point of departure—identity politics are inherently reactionary because they are a struggle for positions of power within the current social matrix rather than the struggle for a radical new symbolic order

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Much Marxism has been stuck in the idea that any revolutionary change has to take the working class as its point of departure. The ‘ideal’ has been dirty, hard working industrial workers. It has been discussed whether small, private farmers were poor enough; whether one could be progressive, if one had changed from overalls to a suit. The central point for Žižek, however, is not the particular attributes of a certain group, but its placement in relation to the whole of capi -talism. The proletariat for Marx is the symbol of a universal human -ity – and as such it points towards a society beyond exploitation and humiliation. For Žižek, the important point is not whether the prole - tariat was or is the most suppressed class, but whether its existence embodies the internal contradictions and imbalances of capitalism. One must therefore distinguish between the working class as a social group (as placed within the social matrix, as majority) and the pro -letariat as an agent, which in a militant way struggles for ‘universal truth’ (as the group that breaks with the social matrix, as minority) (Žižek 1999: 226f). There is no necessary connection between these two groups. The crucial point is therefore whether one is answering to the idea of a system beyond the exploitation and impoverishment of capitalism, or whether one is fighting for one’s own privileges. Should the struggle be understood as a struggle for positions within the same social matrix, or is the struggle a struggle for a new and radically different society? Class struggle is not initially a struggle between classes, but rather a struggle to cover up or make apparent the flaws and inconsistencies of capitalism. The danger of perceiving class struggle as the strug - gle for recognition and rights, for example, is that it thereby supports fixed identities and social roles – and in effect capitalism as a system. Class struggle and classes themselves are not that which all social phenomena can be reduced to, but rather a generative matrix that conditions the different ideological horizons, through which society is attributed meaning (Žižek 2002b: 190). [A] class society in which the ideological perception of the class division was pure and direct would be a harmonious structure with no struggle – or to put it in Laclau’s terms, class antagonism would thereby be fully symbolized; it would no longer be impossible/real, but a simple differential structural feature. (Žižek 1999: 187) Žižek’s view of the proletariat is strongly inspired by Hegel’s thoughts of the Lumpenproletariat . This group was exactly charac - terised by not being contemplated as a class sui generis . For Žižek, similarly, the proletariat is the group that does not fit into the capital - ist whole. Revolutionary struggle is therefore not a struggle for more salary, for instance, as such a struggle will only make certain dis - placements within a given system possible. Any political act that is taking its point of departure in particular identities and their demands – whether they be ethnic, religious, sexual or simply different life - styles – remains reactionary (Žižek 2003: 132f). Revolutionary strug - gle, on the contrary, questions the symbolic itself – the fact that the being of the worker is reduced to a commodity.

### Link – Intersectionality

#### Class must be recognized as qualitatively the most important oppression—otherwise the system is able to satisfy demands on grounds of formal equality, destroying attempts to overcome capitalist oppression.

Giminez, ’01 [Martha, Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: <http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html>]  
  
There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. **This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory**, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9). I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). **Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it.** Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered." In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). **Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators** (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). **Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher** (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, **class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression**. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. **The working class**, on the other hand**, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital** and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). **While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged**. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. **The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth**, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. **In so far as** the **"class"** in RGC **remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential.** Nevertheless, **I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument** not only **on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change** but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that **some power relations are more important and consequential than others**. **For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former**. In my view, **the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations.** In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression**, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination**. **Class relations** -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- **are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them.** **Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers.** **Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances.** **To argue**, then, **that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.**

### \*\*\*A2: General Marx/Cap Focus Bad Args – Top Level

#### Marxism doesn’t ignore race – just places a different causality

Taylor 11 [Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, on the editorial board of the International Socialist Review and a doctoral student in African American Studies at Northwestern University; “Race, class and Marxism,” SocialistWorker.org, <http://socialistworker.org/2011/01/04/race-class-and-marxism>]

Marxists believe that the potential for that kind of unity is dependant on battles and struggles against racism today. Without a commitment by revolutionary organizations in the here and now to the fight against racism, working-class unity will never be achieved and the revolutionary potential of the working class will never be realized. Yet despite all the evidence of this commitment to fighting racism over many decades, Marxism has been maligned as, at best, "blind" to combating racism and, at worst, "incapable" of it. For example, in an article published last summer, popular commentator and self-described "anti-racist" Tim Wise summarized the critique of "left activists" that he later defines as Marxists. He writes: [L]eft activists often marginalize people of color by operating from a framework of extreme class reductionism, which holds that the "real" issue is class, not race, that "the only color that matters is green," and that issues like racism are mere "identity politics," which should take a backseat to promoting class-based universalism and programs to help working people. This reductionism, by ignoring the way that even middle class and affluent people of color face racism and color-based discrimination (and by presuming that low-income folks of color and low-income whites are equally oppressed, despite a wealth of evidence to the contrary) reinforces white denial, privileges white perspectivism and dismisses the lived reality of people of color. Even more, as we'll see, it ignores perhaps the most important political lesson regarding the interplay of race and class: namely, that the biggest reason why there is so little working-class consciousness and unity in the Untied States (and thus, why class-based programs to uplift all in need are so much weaker here than in the rest of the industrialized world), is precisely because of racism and the way that white racism has been deliberately inculcated among white working folks. Only by confronting that directly (rather than sidestepping it as class reductionists seek to do) can we ever hope to build cross-racial, class based coalitions. In other words, for the policies favored by the class reductionist to work--be they social democrats or Marxists--or even to come into being, racism and white supremacy must be challenged directly. Here, Wise accuses Marxism of: "extreme class reductionism," meaning that Marxists allegedly think that class is more important than race; reducing struggles against racism to "mere identity politics"; and requiring that struggles against racism should "take a back seat" to struggles over economic issues. Wise also accuses so-called "left activists" of reinforcing "white denial" and "dismiss[ing] the lived reality of people of color"--which, of course, presumes Left activists and Marxists to all be white. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - What do Marxists actually say? Marxists argue that capitalism is a system that is based on the exploitation of the many by the few. Because it is a system based on gross inequality, it requires various tools to divide the majority--racism and all oppressions under capitalism serve this purpose. Moreover, oppression is used to justify and "explain" unequal relationships in society that enrich the minority that live off the majority's labor. Thus, racism developed initially to explain and justify the enslavement of Africans--because they were less than human and undeserving of liberty and freedom. Everyone accepts the idea that the oppression of slaves was rooted in the class relations of exploitation under that system. Fewer recognize that **under capitalism, wage slavery is the pivot around which all other inequalities and oppressions turn**. Capitalism used racism to justify plunder, conquest and slavery, but as Karl Marx pointed out, it also used racism to divide and rule--to pit one section of the working class against another and thereby blunt class consciousness. **To claim**, as Marxists do, **that racism is a product of capitalism is not to deny** or diminish **its importance** or impact in American society. It is simply to explain its origins and the reasons for its perpetuation. Many on the left today talk about class as if it is one of many oppressions, often describing it as "classism." What people are really referring to as "classism" is elitism or snobbery, and not the fundamental organization of society under capitalism. Moreover, it is popular today to talk about various oppressions, including class, as intersecting. While it is true that oppressions can reinforce and compound each other, they are born out of the material relations shaped by capitalism and the economic exploitation that is at the heart of capitalist society. In other words, it is the material and economic structure of society that gave rise to a range of ideas and ideologies to justify, explain and help perpetuate that order. In the United States, racism is the most important of those ideologies. Despite the widespread beliefs to the contrary of his critics, Karl Marx himself was well aware of the centrality of race under capitalism. While Marx did not write extensively on the question of slavery and its racial impact in societies specifically, he did write about the way in which European capitalism emerged because of its pilfering, rape and destruction, famously writing: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of Black skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. He also recognized the extent to which slavery was central to the world economy. He wrote: Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that has given the colonies their value; it is the colonies that have created world trade, and it is world trade that is the pre-condition of large-scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance. Without slavery North America, the most progressive of countries, would be transformed into a patriarchal country. Wipe out North America from the map of the world, and you will have anarchy--the complete decay of modern commerce and civilization. Cause slavery to disappear and you will have wiped America off the map of nations. Thus slavery, because it is an economic category, has always existed among the institutions of the peoples. Modern nations have been able only to disguise slavery in their own countries, but they have imposed it without disguise upon the New World. Thus, there is a fundamental understanding of the centrality of slave labor in the national and international economy. But what about race? Despite the dearth of Marx's own writing on race in particular, one might look at Marx's correspondence and deliberations on the American Civil War to draw conclusions as to whether Marx was as dogmatically focused on purely economic issues as his critics make him out be. One must raise the question: If Marx was reductionist, how is his unabashed support and involvement in abolitionist struggles in England explained? If Marx was truly an economic reductionist, he might have surmised that slavery and capitalism were incompatible, and simply waited for slavery to whither away. W.E.B. Du Bois in his Marxist tome Black Reconstruction, quotes at length a letter penned by Marx as the head of the International Workingmen's Association, written to Abraham Lincoln in 1864 in the midst of the Civil War: The contest for the territories which opened the epoch, was it not to decide whether the virgin soil of immense tracts should be wedded to the labor of the immigrant or be prostituted by the tramp of the slaver driver? When an oligarchy of 300,000 slave holders dared to inscribe for the first time in the annals of the world "Slavery" on the banner of armed revolt, when on the very spots where hardly a century ago the idea of one great Democratic Republic had first sprung up, whence the first declaration of the rights of man was issued...when on the very spots counter-revolution...maintained "slavery to be a beneficial institution"...and cynically proclaimed property in man 'the cornerstone of the new edifice'...then the working classes of Europe understood at once...that the slaveholders' rebellion was to sound the tocsin for a general holy war of property against labor... They consider it an earnest sign of the epoch to come that it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggles for the rescue of the enchained race and the Reconstruction of a social order. Not only was Marx personally opposed to slavery and actively organized against it, but he theorized that slavery and the resultant race discrimination that flowed from it were not just problems for the slaves themselves, but for white workers who were constantly under the threat of losing work to slave labor. This did not mean white workers were necessarily sympathetic to the cause of the slaves--most of them were not. But Marx was not addressing the issue of consciousness, but objective factors when he wrote in Capital, "In the United States of America, every independent movement of the workers was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic. Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the Black it is branded." Moreover, Marx understood the dynamics of racism in a modern sense as well--as a means by which workers who had common, objective interests with each other could also become mortal enemies because of subjective, but nevertheless real, racist and nationalist ideas. Looking at the tensions between Irish and English workers, with a nod toward the American situation between Black and white workers, Marx wrote: Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude is much the same as that of the "poor whites" to the "niggers" in the former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it. Out of this quote, one can see a Marxist theory of how racism operated in contemporary society, after slavery was ended. Marx was highlighting three things: first, that capitalism promotes economic competition between workers; second, that the ruling class uses racist ideology to divide workers against each other; and finally, that when one group of workers suffer oppression, it negatively impacts the entire class.

#### This is Interpassivity – denouncing our politics as “totalizing” conceals an individualistic politics that valorizes difference and remains content with endless minor reforms

Dean ’11 [Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, “What is to be done? (4)”, <http://jdeanicite.typepad.com/i_cite/2011/02/what-is-to-be-done.html>]

1. Lenin: "The worst sin we commit is that we degrade our political and organizational tasks to the level of the immediate, 'palpable,' 'concrete' interests of the everyday economic struggle; yet they singing to us the same refrain: Lend the economic struggle itself a political character!" Sometime I find it so strange, so puzzling, that the spontaneity, immediacy, concreteness, amateurism, and emphasis on the everyday that Lenin condemns as primitivism and economism is taken so widely for granted among so many left activists and intellectuals. Is this uncritical acceptance a reaction to what many see as the mistakes of the Soviet period? Is it a more recent response to the failures and compromises of communist parties in other countries (I'm thinking mostly of Italy here)? Is it a reaction to the rigidity of some communists in the US and the UK, a reaction by those who associate themselves with a new left? Or are other explanations equally or even more compelling--absorption of a 100 years of anti-communism, cooptation by the pleasures of capitalism, relief through forfeiture of responsibility for the terribly hard work of organizing? So many strands of intellectual ideology converge: don't speak for another, appreciate differences, celebrate locality. It's no wonder that a politics can't emerge. Dogmatism, demands, and organization are discounted in advance.I should put this differently. There is a politics here: an individualist politics whose sole principle is that of individual freedom, where this freedom is reduced to particular choice and decision, even as it blocks access to organized contestation and rebuilding of the conditions of choice and decision. Did I choose to live in a society where security is privatized, where required home and car insurance is subject to a market and a set of corporations whose interest is in profit and not my well-being? Did I choose to live in a society where wealth is held in more esteem than fairness, creativity, or scientific curiosity? Did I have a choice to live in a society where a collective good like space exploration is subordinated to tax breaks for the top one percent? 2. For Lenin, mass movement and "professional revolutionaries" are not alternative organizational forms. Each is necessary: Such workers, average people of the masses, are capable of displaying enormous energy and self-sacrifice in strikes and in street battles with the police and the troops, and are capable (in fact are alone capable) of determining the outcome of our entire movement--but the struggle against the political police requires special qualities; it requires professional revolutionaries. Lenin gives one reason for the need of professional revolutionaries--the police make every strike and every demonstration a secret. They prevent news of the strikes from spreading. Do we have the same problem? Cutting of Internet services in Egypt suggests a contemporary version of this kind of policing role, as do the attacks on journalists and the disruptions of Al Jazeera's signals. Yet news from Cairo was getting out and it was circulating in the country, even more, news of the struggles in multiple cities reinforced the struggles' as dimensions of one struggle. No one will deny that Egypt has been under authoritarian rule for decades. It's not surprising, then, that there are resonances with Russian at the beginning of the 20th century. The situation of the US, UK, and Europe under communicative capitalism suggests a different problem. The effect of the police--non knowledge of strikes and resistance--is achieved differently, now via over-kill, deluge, distraction, and obfuscation. Too much information becomes too little. Too much analysis and commentary deflects and displaces. The culture of media circulates and redirects energies away from direct confrontation. No wonder turning off the internet in Egypt had energizing effects--people had to get information from each other on the streets.

## Narratives

### 2NC /1NR Autobiography Bad

#### Auto-biography fails and can’t translate into workable politics

Christopher A. McAuley ‘01, University of California, Santa Barbara, American Literature, Volume 73, Number 2, June 2001, pp. 438-439 (Article), Autobiography and Black Identity Politics: Racialization in Twentieth-Century America (review), Project Muse, online, jj

In Autobiography and Black Identity Politics, Kenneth Mostern considers ‘‘the extent to which nearly all African American political leaders regardless of politics . . . have chosen to write personal stories as a means of theorizing their political positions’’ (12). Mostern’s definition of the African American autobiography is key to his assessment of its particular strengths and weaknesses: ‘‘an articulation based on the determinate memory and recall of experience via the lens of traumatically constrained ideology, to describe the continuing racialization of politics’’ (10). However, it is precisely on the political front, Mostern argues, that the autobiography is inadequate: mere description does not provide a political plan of action. Still, he concludes that the ‘‘recognition of the limitation of the process, like the identity itself, can only emerge through the process, to which there is no alternative’’ (11).

The autobiography as political project, Mostern argues, falls short of what he proposes is its goal, by either failing to do justice to the sociological groundings of the author’s racialized identity or by emphasizing racialized social structure to the point of virtually denying the author’s subjectivity. An example of the first type, according to Mostern, is Zora Neale Hurston’s Dust Tracks on a Road, and of the second, Angela Davis’s Autobiography.

#### Personal narratives aren’t radical—prioritizing them makes social location the new dogma, and tying it to the ballot commodifies their story-telling replicating the worst excesses of liberalism

Coughlin 95—associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)

Several prominent outsider scholars have offered what seems to be a simple solution: outsiders should start telling stories about themselves. Storytelling, they claim, has a radical transformative [\*1231] potential. If the experiences of African-Americans and women have been invisible to or misconstrued by lawmakers, then outsider law professors must use their positions of influence to communicate the intangibles of outsider experience, intangibles that are repressed by traditional legal doctrine, analysis and theory. By telling stories about their individual experiences and pain, outsiders strive to transform the legal academy and legal scholarship, the law itself, and ultimately the larger culture. This proposal has proved to be invigorating for both outsider and insider scholars. Outsiders have begun including autobiographical narratives in their law review articles and books, and insiders have responded with praise and criticism, and also with some stories of their own. n4

For outsiders, autobiography would seem to be a foolproof strategy for recuperating marginalized experience. It is politically interventionist and theoretically disruptive, and yet at the same time flexible, sensitive, and immediately accessible. What harm can outsiders do by telling their own stories? At best, their stories will disturb and then persuade insiders that law should reflect the reality of outsider experience. At worst, the insiders will not listen or will mishear. In either case, storytelling should reinforce outsiders' commitment to a resistant scholarship and inspire other outsiders to offer their own autobiographies in support of the cause.

These claims on behalf of storytelling deserve serious scrutiny. Outsider scholars - or, for that matter, insider scholars who also employ autobiography - must consider whether and in what sense this form of representation achieves the goals of outsider scholarship. To what extent does outsider autobiography rescue formerly ignored experiences and points of view, or permit the author to break through the cultural limitations of legal discourse? If the law is to comprehend its social obligations through the perspective of the individual storyteller, the tactic affirmed by the autobiographical project, then it is imperative to clarify and evaluate the nature of the perspectives that storytellers construct.

In this paper, I will argue that autobiography is not simply a transparent medium through which the self may give voice to what [\*1232] it alone knows. Nor is autobiography an unconditioned mode of representation that opens up subjective spaces hitherto unexplored. For one thing, an autobiographical narrative makes the same ontological commitments to readers as legal discourse. Autobiography places limitations on the range of available meanings similar to those imposed by law. In addition, many literary critics and historians have suggested that autobiography and the experiences it constructs are shaped by the same cultural values reflected in law. Far from eluding the constraints of legal discourse and cultural bias, therefore, autobiography may lead outsiders to become the unwitting proponents of the very values they most want to resist.

Perhaps more crucially, the outsiders' intention to liberate discourse from dogmatic or culture-bound types of objectivity is threatened by the possibility that their works will merely achieve a simple reversal of academic orthodoxy. By celebrating individual perspectives, reliance on autobiography may establish authorial subjectivity as the new form of unassailable dogma, the new tale that wags our legal discourse.

Despite its potential complicity in a culture the outsiders decry, storytelling is an attractive enterprise because it is remunerative. Yet this feature of outsider storytelling raises additional questions about the role of these ostensibly resistant texts, particularly the meaning that context imposes on them. The scholars who tell the stories receive material rewards for publishing them. The authors are also lawyers or, at least, critics of the law, whose purpose in offering the stories is instrumental to some end. By recounting painful, personal experiences to an audience willing to pay for them, the authors use themselves and their suffering as a market commodity. Similarly, because the storytellers want lawmakers to recognize and remedy their suffering, they must make their stories intelligible (and in some sense marketable) to the audience whose understanding and intervention they seek, even as they rebuke it. Thus, the storyteller is never free from the constraints imposed by her audience's expectations. While autobiographies may possess a transformative power, one must wonder what they transform. Will the practice of telling one's own stories transform legal culture, as the outsiders claim? Or will that practice more likely transform the self who tells the story? [\*1233]

#### \*[DON’T NEED TO READ] Elevating the self and personal experience replicates individualistic liberalism

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Far from being discomforting, let alone subversive, the story these ostensibly resistant texts tell about the relationship between the self and law is surprisingly consistent with the guiding tenets of liberalism. These texts describe the individual self, its material needs, and psychological desires as central concerns of law. At the same time, the texts provide evidence of the satisfactions the self achieves by earning its way independently of the various forms of social assistance law might afford. Since this story is difficult to distinguish from the stock legal narratives the outsiders oppose, n77 we must consider whether narrative conventions, like those of legal discourse, have a tendency to manipulate the storyteller into affirming the status quo.

Curiously, although outsiders' stories contest the mechanisms through which law and other cultural institutions evaluate and (thereby) produce truth claims, n78 none of the storytellers has pondered the role that the narrative form plays in shaping the meaning of the activities, relationships, and feelings being narrated. n79 On the contrary, the storytellers are, in general, unselfconscious and unreflective with regard to the potential of narrative to guide and even predetermine the experiences they report. Instead, as I argued above, they insist that autobiography furnishes a transparent window onto experience. n80 If we believe, however, that [\*1253] actual lived experiences and narratives of those experiences occupy different orders of existence - perhaps, because the form in which lived events present themselves to us is not identical to the form in which they are represented in the narrative vehicle n81 - then we must examine the inevitable ways in which narrative arranges, orders, elaborates, and filters (through additions and subtractions) the original experience. That outsider autobiographical narratives are refined, rhetorically adroit mediations of experience further complicates the claim that these representations are purer, or more authentic, than other kinds of mediating discourse. Thus, one question on which we must focus "is not "What does any given story mean?' but rather "What does narrative itself (or narrativizing a text) mean?' " n82

It may be that reliance on the narrative form is problematic for those pursuing a radical social agenda, for some theorists have argued that narrative is made possible by and inevitably reinforces [\*1254] the reigning system of law. n83 Professor Hayden White has been particularly concerned with discovering the kind of meaning that narrative supplies when real events are recorded in the form of a story. n84 As White argues, real events do not present themselves to us as stories, with the formal characteristics of coherent plot, or the "central subjects, proper beginnings, middles, and ends," that we have come to associate with stories. n85 Real events simply occur, waiting for an observer with the impulse to record them to select a form of representation and in the process impose order on reality, even create a culture-specific reality out of mere sequences of events. n86

Our culture privileges the narrative mode of representation above other available forms, according to White, because narrative gratifies our desire to invest real events with moral and ethical meaning. n87 For example, narrative contrives a sense of closure [\*1255] through the author's selection of a point at which to conclude, which real events themselves stubbornly refuse to do. n88 This closure, White argues, is produced by a human consciousness aware of its location within and dependence on a social system governed by law. n89 For it is law that endows the historian with a conception of justice or morality, against which she distinguishes the real events worthy of being represented from those that are unworthy. n90

These speculations suggest that we must qualify, perhaps significantly, the outsiders' assertions concerning the revolutionary power of their narratives. Just like the legal discourse that the outsiders condemn, narrative "presupposes some criteria of relevance" that guide the storyteller's selection, arrangement for emphasis, and causal reordering of the events to be included in the story. n91 As one historian explains, "the narrative can be said to [\*1256] determine the evidence as much as the evidence determines the narrative" because the "evidence only counts as evidence and is only recognized as such in relation to a potential narrative." n92 Even if we reject White's suspicion that the criterion that guides all narrative accounts of real events is "law, legality, legitimacy, or, more generally, authority," n93 his theory of narrative meaning still exposes the ambivalent political allegiances of the outsider autobiographies. In these texts, no less than in legal opinions or traditional legal scholarship, our system of law is enthroned as the "central organizing principle of meaning." n94 Law and the legal academy are the subjects that link together, indeed, call forth, each of the personal experiences recounted. The texts are not a desultory collection of personal reminiscences. Rather, they record only those events that support particular claims against or on behalf of law and the academy. For example, Professor Robin West describes her own promiscuity to support her charge that the definition of "consensual sex" applied by law in rape cases conceals the danger of violent male sexuality that women endure. n95 Professor Patricia Williams elaborates the racist content of episodes from her [\*1257] life to create an occasion for her to display her intellectual prowess and professional accomplishments to an academy reluctant to admit African-American women. n96 And Professor Richard Delgado recalls conversations in which senior colleagues warned him to avoid writing about "civil rights or other "ethnic' subjects" to provide evidence of the jealous insularity and undemocratic character of the mainstream civil rights academy. n97

These texts reveal that the law and its specific institutional interests, both in practice and in the academy, already define the relevant points of intersection for the experiences recounted in the outsider narratives. In other words, the law and the academy implicitly supply the appropriate points of contention for outsider narrators. Just as legal doctrine determines the facts that judges will find, so the conventions, practices, and concerns of law and the academy furnish the space for debate and perhaps even produce the truth that outsider stories report by determining which events are significant (or real) enough to be represented. This is one of a variety of ways, then, in which the narrative form distinctly mitigates the subversive intention of outsider storytelling.

To be sure, each of these texts expresses dissatisfaction with law and the professional academy and offers suggestions for reform. Ironically, this criticism celebrates the power of law and reproduces law's indifference to the marginalized position that African Americans and women occupy within our culture no less forcefully than recourse to litigation would do. Contrary to Richard Delgado's assertion, the storytellers really do not propose to subvert law's authority; n98 rather, they supplicate law to exercise its authority so that outsiders, no less than affluent white men, enjoy the same access to, and power to define, the good life. Among the many grievances they detail, law should be authorized to ease the suffering of the impoverished by advancing basic levels of food, housing, medical care, and education; n99 to protect women from domestic violence and the injury of childbirth; n100 to secure women's [\*1258] erotic pleasure just as it secures that of men; n101 to support the African-American nomos by financing African-American schools, while preserving the opportunity of African-Americans to attend white schools; n102 to remedy the harms that hate speech causes; n103 to relieve outsider employees from the grooming preferences imposed by corporate employers; n104 and to assure that workplaces are safe for all employees. n105

Nor do the storytellers propose to tear down the academy. What they want (and have achieved) is to be welcomed within the academy's gates and to speak from behind its sheltering walls. n106 Thus, the academy should "recruit" and "nurture" as scholars those whom culture has victimized, n107 revise its traditional evaluative standards so as to count outsiders' special experiential wisdom as an intellectual credential, n108 and bestow on them the customary professional titles, accoutrements, and perquisites. n109 [\*1259]

By so grossly streamlining the storytellers' allegations, I do not intend to deride their contribution to our understanding of the practices that have relegated people of color and women to poverty, servitude, and obscurity. Rather, I offer it to emphasize that the storytellers' opposition to law concludes by reaffirming the core values of our legal system. Our appreciation of the injustices their narratives provoke is itself derived from the remedial authority of the law, and the cultural sense of justice the law provides is the context for our understanding.

At this point, I want to anticipate an objection that the storytellers and some of their readers may interject. The objection is this: the outsider storytellers are not merely identifying or trying to repair law's failure to make good on (among others) its promise of equal respect and equal opportunity for all persons regardless of race or gender. Rather, by conferring on law authority to intervene in and remedy a broader range of outsider grievances than liberal individualist ideology would seem to allow, they are producing a revolutionary vision of a human self that is dependent on external assistance for its well-being.

This objection might be a forceful one, particularly if the outsider project began to identify not only the legal mechanisms that consign women and people of color to dependence on social relief, but also those that dictate and support, even as they privilege, the identity of white men. n110 Ultimately, however, the autobiographical self constructed by these texts overwhelms any alternative vision of human nature they might offer. When Richard Delgado identifies the storytellers' desire to elude the role of "supplicant" as one of the primary motivations underlying their project, he never remarks that such desire is produced by and understandable only within a system, such as liberal individualism, that condemns as failures those whose success, if not survival, is attributed to legal [\*1260] or social relief. Thus, even as they demand law's intervention on behalf of other outsiders - African Americans and women condemned to haunt the margins of a community committed to individual solutions n111 - the storytellers are busy proving that they are not supplicants. They achieved their success the liberal way; they earned it. No less than insider texts, the outsider narratives instruct other outsiders that if they would succeed they too must do it by themselves. In the end, therefore, these stories mirror and support the liberal power relations the outsiders would dismantle.

### A2: You Silence Us

#### We have to be willing to recognize that strategic silence might be preferable to the 1AC’s rush to narrate. Instead of assuming the revelation of the truth is the only path to emancipation, we should explore the potential of silence as a route to liberation.

Wendy Brown, Professor of Political Theory @ UC Berkeley, 1996 (“Constitutions and 'Survivor Stories': In the 'folds of our own discourse' The Pleasures and Freedoms of Silence.” 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 185)

But if these practices tacitly silence those whose experiences do not parallel those whose suffering is most marked (or whom the discourse produces as suffering markedly), they also condemn those whose sufferings they record to a permanent identification with that suffering. Here, we experience a temporal ensnaring in 'the folds of our own discourses' insofar as we identify ourselves in speech in a manner that condemns us to live in a present dominated by the past. But what if speech and silence aren't really opposites? Indeed, what if to speak incessantly of one's suffering is to silence the possibilities of overcoming it, of living beyond it, of identifying as something other than it? What if this incessant speech not only overwhelms the experiences of others, but alternative (unutterable? traumatized? fragmentary? inassimilable?) zones of one's own experience? Conversely, what if a certain modality of silence about one's suffering--and I am suggesting that we must consider modalities of silence as varied as modalities of speech and discourse--is to articulate a variety of possibilities not otherwise available to the sufferer?

In The Drowned and the Saved, n24 Primo Levi offers drowning as a meta- phor for the initial experience of entering concentration camps, particularly for those who did not speak German or Polish: " . . . filled with a dreadful sound and fury signifying nothing: a hubbub of people without names or faces drowned in a continuous, deafening background noise from which, however, the human word did not surface." n25 This is a drowning in a world of unfa- miliar as well as terrifying words and noise, a world of no civil structure but so much humanity that one's own becomes a question. Primo Levi thus makes drowning function as a symbol for a lost linguistic order and as a sign of a lost civil order, for being at sea in words which do not communicate and by which one cannot communicate. n26 In a radically different context, Adrienne Rich also relates drowning to speech: "your silence today is a pond where drowned things live." n27 Allowing, perhaps perversely, the Rich to rest on the Levi, I wonder if Rich's line need only be read in its most obvious meaning-- as an injunction to speak or die, a mandate to speak in order to recover the drowned things, recover life. What if the accent marks were placed differently so that silence becomes a place where drowned things live, a place where Levi's drowning inmates survive despite being overwhelmed by the words which fill and consume the air necessary for life? What if the drowned things live in the pond, where it is silent, as they could not survive if brought back into the exposure of light and air, the cacophony of the Camp? What if silence is a reprieve from drowning in words which do not communicate or confer recognition, which only bombard or drown? n28

Of course, this possibility is heavy with paradox insofar as drowning already signals death and a pond where drowned things live therefore harbors death rather than life. But this paradox may also serve the other point I am after here: perhaps there are dead or deadening (anti-life) things which must be allowed residence in that pond of silence rather than surfaced into discourse if life is to be lived without being claimed by their weight. Certain experienc- es--concentration camp existence or childhood abuse--may conservatively claim their subjects when those experiences are incessantly remembered in speech, when survivors can only and always speak of what they almost did not survive and thus cannot break with that threat to live in a present not dominated by it. And what if this endless speaking about one's past of suffering is a means of attempting to excoriate guilt about what one did not do to prevent the suffering, an attempt which is doomed insofar as the speaking actually perpetuates by disavowing the guilt? n29

If to speak repeatedly of a trauma is a mode of encoding it as identity, it may be the case that drowned things must be consigned to live in a pond of silence in order to make a world--a future--that is other than them. Put slightly differently by Primo Levi, "a memory evoked too often, and in the form of a story, tends to become fixed in a stereotype . . . crystallized, perfected, adorned, installing itself in the place of the raw memory and growing at its expense." n30 Many feminist narratives of suffering would seem to bear precisely this character; rather than working through the "raw memo- ry" to a place of an emancipation, our discourses of survivorship become stories by which we live, or refuse to live, in the present. There is a fine but critical distinction here between on the one hand, re-entering a trauma, speaking its unspeakable elements, even politicizing it, in order to reconfigure the trauma and the traumatized subject, and on the other, retelling the trauma in such a way as to preserve by resisting the pain of it, and thus to preserve the traumatized subject. While such a distinction is probably not always sustainable, it may be all that secures the possibility that we dwell in neither a politics of pain nor of pain's disavowal.

Finally, I wonder if by putting all into discourse women do not risk sacrificing the rewards of the fragile hold some of us have acquired on autonomy, on the capacity to craft our own lives and experiences rather than living almost fully at the behest of others. If there are some experiences which, according to Hannah Arendt, "cannot withstand the glare of public light without being extinguished," n31 do we not set at risk this very recent acquisi- tion? Here I am thinking about the pleasures of creative writing and other artistic practices; therapeutic work intended to fortify and emancipate rather than discipline its subjects; relatively uncoerced sexual lives; and some modi- cum of choice in reproductive and mothering practices. When all such experi- ences are put into discourse--when our sexual, emotional, reproductive, and creative lives are all exhaustively chronicled--this would seem to imperil the experiences of autonomy, creation, and even privacy so long denied women and so hard won. Indeed, are we so accustomed to being without privacy and autonomy that we compulsively evade and sabotage them? Do we feel we have nothing of value to protect from public circulation and scrutiny? Are we compelled to reiterate the experience of the historically subordinated to be without a room of one's own, without a zone of privacy in which our lives go unreported, without a domain of creativity free from surveillance . . . this time by our own eyes? Are we so habituated to being watched that we cannot feel real, cannot feel our experiences to be real, unless we are watching and reporting them? Might we need to examine whether we eroticize the denigra- tion in the conventional lack of privacy afforded women? Or are we still wres- tling with an insufficiently developed feminine ego, one which fears autonomy more than its absence? Cast in a different idiom, if femininity is, among other things, a disciplinary practice, Foucault reminds us that the good disciplinary subject is one who has fully introjected the surveillant gaze. n32

### Link – Confessional Discourse

#### The affirmative’s belief in exposure of stories of private violence to the public sphere in order to politicize and negate the injury rest on the belief that truth will set us free, but this is part of a mystification where the breaking of silence is a political act. The process of exposure makes this previously private action an act of a regulatory discipline with the state normalizing its intervention into our lives depoliticizing the structural, economic, social, and political conditions that allow violence to exist.

Wendy Brown, Professor of Political Theory @ UC Berkeley, 1996 (“Constitutions and 'Survivor Stories': In the 'folds of our own discourse' The Pleasures and Freedoms of Silence.” 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable 185)

But if the silences in discourses of domination are a site for insurrectionary noise, if they are the corridors we must fill with explosive counter-tales, it is also possible to make a fetish of breaking silence. Even more than a fetish, it is possible that this ostensible tool of emancipation carries its own techniques of subjugation--that it converges with non-emancipatory tendencies in contem- porary culture (for example, the ubiquity of confessional discourse and rampant personalization of political life), that it establishes regulatory norms, coincides with the disciplinary power of confession, in short, feeds the powers we meant to starve. While attempting to avoid a simple reversal of feminist valorizations of breaking silence, it is this dimension of silence and its putative opposite with which this Article is concerned.

In the course of this work, I want to make the case for silence not simply as an aesthetic but a political value, a means of preserving certain practices and dimensions of existence from regulatory power, from normative violence, as well as from the scorching rays of public exposure. I also want to suggest a link between, on the one hand, a certain contemporary tendency concerning the lives of public figures--the confession or extraction of every detail of private and personal life (sexual, familial, therapeutic, financial) and, on the other, a certain practice in feminist culture: the compulsive putting into public discourse of heretofore hidden or private experiences--from catalogues of sexual pleasures to litanies of sexual abuses, from chronicles of eating disorders to diaries of homebirths, lesbian mothering, and Gloria Steinam's inner revolution. In linking these two phenomena--the privatization of public life via the mechanism of public exposure of private life on the one hand, and the compulsive/compulsory cataloguing of the details of women's lives on the other--I want to highlight a modality of regulation and depoliticization specific to our age that is not simply confessional but empties private life into the public domain, and thereby also usurps public space with the relatively trivial, rendering the political personal in a fashion that leaves injurious social, political and economic powers unremarked and untouched. In short, while intended as a practice of freedom (premised on the modernist conceit that the truth shall make us free), these productions of truth not only bear the capacity to chain us to our injurious histories as well as the stations of our small lives but also to instigate the further regulation of those lives, all the while depoliti- cizing their conditions.

### Link – Self Focus

#### Every time they say “WHAT WE SAY HERE IS MORE IMPORTANT” or describe their arg in terms of ETHICS -- they are denigrating the outside debate space which means they can never mobilize a larger public to oppose government killing. Focusing on yourself makes reinventing democracy impossible

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in Berkeley. *Krisis*, RECLAIMING DEMOCRACY. AN INTERVIEW WITH WENDY BROWN ON OCCUPY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SECULARISM, Issue 3, www.krisis.eu

I don’t think it is possible to think democracy from a Foucauldian perspective for several reasons, and I think it’s telling that Foucault himself seemed utterly uninterested in the question of democracy. I don’t mean he was an anti-democrat. He became interested in the question of counter-conducts, individual efforts at crafting the self, to subvert, interrupt or vivisect forces governing or constructing us, but that’s very different from attending to the question of democracy. I want to say one other thing here before I then directly answer your question. I’ve lately been rereading his lectures on neoliberalism and one thing I’m very struck by is that there is an absent figure in Foucault’s own formulation of modernity, when he offers us the picture of homo economicus and homo juridicus as the two sides of governance and the human being in modernity. Foucault just says you’ve got on the one hand the subject of interest, homo economicus and on the other hand homo juridicus, the derivative from sovereignty, the creature who’s limiting sovereignty. But for Foucault there’s no homo politicus, there’s no subject of the demos, there’s no democrat, there’s only a creature of rights and a creature of interest. It’s an extremely individually oriented formulation of what the modern order is. There’s the state, there’s the economy and then there’s the subject oriented to the economy by interests and toward the state by rights. But isn't it striking for a French thinker that there’s no democratic subject, no subject oriented, as part of the demos, toward the question of sovereignty by or for the people? Here Foucault may have forgotten to cut off the king’s head in political theory! There are just no democratic energies in Foucault. So one of the reasons one can’t think democracy with Foucault has to do with his own inability to think it. The other reason has to do with the extent to which he has given us such a thick theoretical and empirical account of the powers constructing and conducting us – there’s no way we can democratize all of those powers. So I think there one has to accept that if democracy has a meaning for the left today, it’s going to have to do with modest control of the powers § Marked 20:11 § that govern us overtly, rather than that of power tout court. So it’s going to be a combination of the liberal promise and the old Marxist claim about the necessary conditions of democracy. It’s going to be at some level a realization of the Marxist critique of the liberal promise. We have to have some control over what and how things are produced, we have to have some control over the question of who we are as a people, what we stand for, what we think should be done, what should not be done, what levels of equality should we have, what liberties matter, and so forth. It will not be able to reach to those Foucauldian depths of the conduct of conduct at every level. The dream of democracy probably has to come to terms with that limitation. If we can, we will be able to stop generating formulations of resistance that have to do with individual conduct and ethics. In other words, I think that the way Foucauldian, Derridean, Levinasian and Deleuzian thinking has derailed democratic thinking is that it has pushed it off onto a path of thinking about how I conduct myself, what is my relation to the other, what is my ethos or orientation toward those who are different from me – and all that’s fine, but it’s not democracy in the sense of power sharing. It’s an ethics, and maybe even a democratic ethics. But an ethics is not going to get us to political and economic orders that are more democratic than those we have now. The danger of theory that has too much emphasized the question of the self’s relationship to itself, or to micropowers, as useful as it has been for much of our work, is that it has derailed left democratic thinking into a preoccupation with ethics.